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Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational 
Governments: The U.S. States and Puerto Rico 
Cheryl D. Block
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 2007 and 2009, an economic period now referred to as 
the “Great Recession,” the United States experienced its worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression.
1
 Congressional and 
federal administrative agency interventions during this period 
accordingly were as dramatic and proactive as anything seen since 
the 1930s.
2
 As political controversy swirled around federal assistance 
to private firms, another economic storm was brewing in the public 
sector. In particular, the Great Recession took its toll on struggling 
municipal governments as unexpected shock from the economic 
crisis exposed serious fiscal mismanagement and underlying 
insolvencies. Though municipal bankruptcies historically have been 
 
 *
 
 Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. Thanks to Dean Nancy 
Staudt and the Washington University School of Law for generous research support. Thanks 
also to my research assistants, Joshua Lowenthal and Nicholas Papadimitriou. 
 1. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reports the period from 
December 2007 through June 2009 as the longest U.S. recession since World War II. NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY (2008), http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf [hereinafter NBER REPORT].  
 2. These include: (1) Federal Reserve Bank exercising emergency authority not utilized 
since the Depression to assist American International Group (AIG), the largest U.S. insurance 
company, see BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40438, ONGOING GOVERNMENT 
ASSISTANCE FOR AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) (2009); (2) Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.110-343, tit. I, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767–3800 (Troubled Asset Relief 
Program) (TARP), (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–41) (2012), authorizing Treasury 
Department spending of up to $700 billion for emergency assistance to banks and other 
financial institutions; and (3) Treasury Department assistance to General Motors and Chrysler 
under the TARP umbrella. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (2009). See also Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of 
Government Bailouts, 88 WASH. U. L. REV 149 (2010) (regarding accurate budgetary 
assessment of bailout cost).  
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rare,
3
 the recent recession spawned a series of filings—which 
escalated between 2011 and 2013—when one high-profile 
bankruptcy after another broke “biggest ever” records.4 Honors for 
the “country’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy” passed to Detroit 
in 2013.
5
  
Among the most dramatic illustrations of financial distress at the 
state level is Illinois, which responded to municipal bond credit-
rating downgrades and dangerously underfunded state employee 
pension funds in 2013 with legislation reducing current and retired 
employee benefits.
6
 The State’s cost-reduction efforts were thwarted, 
however, by the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling that the pension 
changes violated government employees’ state constitutional 
protections.
7
 Given insufficient funds to satisfy existing obligations to 
retirees—and no legal authority to reduce them—Illinois must make 
painful fiscal choices, many of which may not be politically palatable 
or even feasible.  
Ultimately, the common last-minute approach to avoiding 
imminent default or government shutdown is more borrowing. 
Indeed, most governments depend upon borrowing, frequently 
relying on investor willingness to “rollover” existing debt, i.e., 
exchanging maturing obligations for new debt rather than demanding 
immediate repayment.
8
 Simply put, governments routinely pay their 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 406 (2014) (reporting fewer than 700 municipal bankruptcies since 
1938, most of which involved special-purpose districts rather than general purpose 
municipalities) (citations omitted). Eligible municipalities may file for federal bankruptcy under 
11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46 (2012) (“Chapter 9 – Adjustments of Debts of a Municipality”).  
 4. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1120, n.1 
(2014) (listing bankruptcies by size). See also id. at 1120, 1130–33. 
 5. Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit, WALL STREET J., Jul. 19, 2013, at 
A1. 
 6. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 98-599 (2013). Underfunded pensions have been the most 
dominant fiscal problem for many U.S. state and local governments since the Great Recession. 
Jack A. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 10–16 (2013) (on 
debates over extent of the underfunded public pension crisis). See also STEVEN MAGUIRE, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT: AN ANALYSIS 3 
(2011). 
 7. Heaton v. Quinn (In re Pension Reform Litig.), 32 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2015).  
 8. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2014) (discussing “why governments, including the United States, routinely depend 
on borrowing new money to repay their maturing debt”). 
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debts with more debt. Recurring rollovers are possible because 
markets tend to view government bonds as relatively safe 
investments on the common assumption that governments cannot 
“fail” in the same way that private entities do. 
Excess borrowing is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also can 
be extremely costly, particularly for governments already tainted by 
credit rating downgrades. Even worse, investors ultimately may 
refuse to lend. Cut off from bond markets, a government that is out of 
funds, yet constitutionally or otherwise mandated to prioritize 
obligations to certain creditors, may simply be unable to pay for 
essential services. Though some U.S. states have come dangerously 
close, no state-level economic crises since the Great Depression has 
reached a point at which rescue aid was critical to the state’s very 
survival as a going concern. Nonetheless, governments that refuse to 
acknowledge even the possibility of such an emergency do so at their 
own peril. 
Indeed, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has reached just such a 
financial precipice.
9
 According to expert testimony from 2015, 
“Puerto Rico’s economy is far-and-away the weakest of any state in 
the country. By many measures . . . it is already suffering an 
economic depression. Even more disconcerting, there is no prospect 
of the economic slide ending any time soon.”10 In its preamble to 
June 2016 emergency legislation authorizing the Governor to impose 
moratoria on certain public debt payments,
11
 the Puerto Rican 
legislature similarly declared: “[t]he fiscal situation of the 
Government of Puerto Rico is more dire than at any other point in its 
history,” adding that “depleted resources and strained liquidity 
threaten to bind the Commonwealth to a choice between honoring its 
commitments to bondholders or continuing to provide the residents of 
 
 9. Though it does not have statehood, Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory treated as a state for 
some purposes, a foreign sovereign for others, and an ill-defined unincorporated U.S. territory 
for still others. See infra notes 128–47 and accompanying text. 
 10. Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Problems: Examining the Source and Exploring the Solution: 
Hearings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Mark Zandi, 
Chief Econ., Moody’s Analytics) [hereinafter Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Problems Hearings]. 
 11. Puerto Rico Emergency Moratorium and Financial Rehabilitation Act, 2016 P.R. 
Laws 21.  
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Puerto Rico with essential services.”12 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Puerto Rico also bluntly observed that the island’s 
government “harbors significant doubt about the Commonwealth’s 
very ability to persist as a going concern,”13 adding that, “what 
started as a financial crisis has since metastasized into a deep 
humanitarian crisis requiring immediate action.”14   
Part I of this Article begins with a description and explanation of 
Puerto Rico’s recent and dramatic financial disaster and the federal 
government’s response, concluding with a brief overview of the 2016 
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA),
15
 compromise legislation adopted by Congress after 
long, partisan debates over whether and how to assist Puerto Rico in 
resolving its economic crisis. Parts II, III, and IV respectively explore 
sovereignty, market, and equity-based arguments for a presumption 
against federal government assistance to financially-distressed 
subnational governments, contrasting the application of these 
principles to U.S. states and the unincorporated territory of Puerto 
Rico. Part V addresses similarities and differences in rebuttal 
arguments that the states and Puerto Rico might use to overcome the 
initial presumption against federal assistance, followed in Part VI 
with suggestions to facilitate the orderly, equitable, and transparent 
structuring of relief efforts in the rare circumstances when federal 
intervention is warranted.   
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 174 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592 (D.P.R. 2016), 
aff’d, 834 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).  
 14. Id. at 602. See also Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1954 
(2016) (“the government and people of Puerto Rico should not have to wait for possible 
congressional action to avert the consequences of unreliable electricity, transportation, and safe 
water—consequences that members of the Executive and Legislature have described as a 
looming ‘humanitarian crisis’”) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
 15. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 
U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 (2016). 
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I. PUERTO RICO’S FISCAL CRISIS 
A. Recent Economic Conditions and Puerto Rico’s Self-Help Efforts 
Puerto Rico’s economy has been contracting for almost a 
decade.
16
 Moreover, the Great Recession, which began on the U.S. 
mainland in late 2007,
17
 took a far greater toll in Puerto Rico, where 
the economic “downturn started earlier and was much steeper and 
more prolonged.”18 As of 2014, Puerto Rico’s approximately $72 
billion debt exceeded 100% of its GNP, a far greater percentage than 
for any U.S. state.
19
 Also by 2014, all three major credit-rating firms 
had downgraded Puerto Rico’s general-obligation bonds to junk 
status,
20
 and the typical investor profile for Puerto Rican debtholders 
had shifted from individuals and pension funds to high-risk hedge 
funds and so-called “vultures” buying at steep discounts.21 Even after 
its debt was downgraded to junk, Puerto Rico nonetheless marketed 
an additional $3.5 billion in new bonds, though largely only by 
 
 16. ANNE O. KRUEGER, RANJIT TEJA & ANDREW WOLFE, PUERTO RICO – A WAY 
FORWARD 3 (2015), http://www.bgfpr.com/documents/PuertoRicoAWayForward.pdf 
[hereinafter KRUEGER ET AL.] 
 17. See NBER REPORT, supra note 1.  
 18. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., AN UPDATE ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF PUERTO RICO’S 
ECONOMY 1 (2014) [hereinafter FED. RES. UPDATE].  
 19. Id. at 16. Some say that Puerto Rico’s debt to GNP ratio is actually closer to 160%—
presumably as calculated after accounting for both debt and unfunded pensions. See, e.g., 
ADDRESSING PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CRISIS AND CREATING A PATH TO 
RECOVERY: ROADMAP FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (Oct. 21, 2015), 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/roadmap_for_congressional_action___puerto_rico_fina
l.pdf [hereinafter ROADMAP FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION]. Reports show just slightly lower 
public debt figures as of July 2016. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION AND OPERATING DATA REPORT 174, tab 1 (Dec. 18, 2016), 
www.bgfpr.com/documents/CommonwealthReport/11-06-15.pdf (public sector debt table). 
 20. Al Yoon, Mike Cherney & Matt Wirz, Global Finance: Puerto Rico to Test Interest in 
Bonds, WALL STREET J., Feb. 12, 2014, at C3. Subsequent downgrades into even deeper “junk 
territory” caused some to conclude that “default [was] a virtual certainty” for “nearly all of the 
island’s public sector debt not covered by bond insurance . . . .” D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R44095, PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT FISCAL CHALLENGES 4 (2016) (citation 
omitted). 
 21. Matt Wirz & Aaron Kuriloff, Mutual Funds at the Forefront on Puerto Rico Talks, 
WALL STREET J., Jul. 20, 2015, at C1. Some “bottom feeding” hedge fund managers even 
reported “waiting for bond prices to fall further before buying . . . banking on the federal 
government coming up with a financial rescue for Puerto Rico . . . .” Michael Corkery, 
Investors Appear to Shrug Off Puerto Rico’s Debt Downgrade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2014, at 
B3. 
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selling to investors willing assume greater risk
22
 and “issued at yields 
above 8 percent—a borrowing cost that would clearly be 
unsustainable if applied to Puerto Rico’s entire debt load.”23 One 
report observes that this “brew of incentives has produced truly 
staggering numbers. On a per-capita basis, Puerto has more than 15 
times the median bond debt of the 50 states, according to Moody’s 
Investors Service.
”24
 Subsequent credit downgrades depressed 
investor confidence to the point that Puerto Rico lost access to 
normal credit markets.
25
 As its crisis deepened, Puerto Rico adopted 
fiscal austerity measures such as reducing public sector 
employment,
26
 increasing taxes,
27
 and reducing public expenses.
28
 
Despite success in negotiating voluntary restructuring agreements 
with some creditors,
29
 holdout creditors made a privately-negotiated 
solution to the public debt crisis impossible.  
At the same time, Puerto Rico’s unique treatment under federal 
bankruptcy laws left it without access to bankruptcy protections 
otherwise available to states for their municipal governments. On the 
 
 22. Michael Corkery, Demand Stronger than Expected for Puerto Rico Debt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 2014, at B6. 
 23. N.Y. FED. UPDATE, supra note 18, at 20.  
 24. Mary Williams Walsh, The Bonds That Broke Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1, 2015, 
at B1. 
 25. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 4. See also KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.  
 26. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 10. 
 27. See, e.g., Tax Reform Process Act, 2015 Laws P.R. 72 (sales and use tax increased 
from 7% to 11.5%, beginning July 1, 2015). Another tax increase measure was so excessive that 
even a sympathetic court could not uphold it. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 174 F. 
Supp. 3d 585, 592 (D.P.R. 2016), aff’d, 834 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (“It 
gives us no pleasure, . . . to enjoin a revenue stream that flows directly into Puerto Rico's 
general fisc. For we, too, are citizens of this island, and we, too, must suffer the consequences 
of the financial disarray on the horizon.”) (challenge to 2015 Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 
amendments). Puerto Rico had also previously increased rates and extended until December 
2017 the expiration date for excise taxes on sales of Puerto Rican-manufactured goods to 
affiliates outside Puerto Rico. 2013 Laws P.R. 2. 
 28. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 10–11 (referring also to public employee pension cuts, but 
noting that some were invalidated by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court).  
 29. For example, 60% of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) creditors agreed 
to concessions in December 2015, including principal “haircuts,” extended maturity dates, and 
reduced interest rates. See The Status of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) 
Restructuring Support Agreement: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 
Subcomm. on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (describing 
restructuring support agreement (RSA) details and evolution) (testimony of Luis Benítez 
Hernández, Chair, PREPA Governing Board) [hereinafter PREPA Hearings].  
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one hand, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly includes Puerto Rico in the 
definition of “state” for federal bankruptcy law purposes.30 Thus, like 
U.S. states generally, it cannot file for its own bankruptcy.
31
 
Chapter 9 nonetheless includes special rules authorizing municipal 
bankruptcies,
32
 but only for municipalities specifically authorized by 
state law.
33
 In other words, had Puerto Rico been a state, it could 
have authorized its public corporations to file for bankruptcy. The 
obstacle for Puerto Rico was a 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendment, 
made with little explanation,
34
 after which a “state” was defined as 
including “the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the 
purposes of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this 
title.”35 Under this amended definition, Puerto Rico was precluded 
from granting access to federal bankruptcy protection for its 
municipalities. Faced with this obstacle, the Puerto Rican legislature 
took matters into its own hands, creating its own bankruptcy-like 
procedures for a fair and orderly restructuring of Puerto Rican 
municipal debt.
36
 Creditors objected to this self-help effort, claiming 
that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits states from adopting 
their own state-level rules that would impose debt restructuring on 
non-consenting creditors.
37
 Agreeing with the creditors, the Supreme 
Court held that Puerto Rico’s restructuring legislation was pre-
empted by federal bankruptcy law.
38
 As Puerto Rico argued in its 
brief to the Court, this holding effectively gives “the worst of both 
 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (“‘State’ includes . . . Puerto Rico, except for the purpose 
of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9”).  
 31. A government entity may be a Chapter 9 debtor “if and only if such entity is a 
municipality.” 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46 (2012) (“Chapter 9 – Adjustments of Debts of a Municipality”). 
“Municipality” is broadly defined as “a political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality 
of a State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (municipality must be “specifically authorized, in its 
capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor . . . by State law, or by a governmental 
officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor . . .”). 
 34. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(j)(6), 
98 Stat. 333, 368–69 (1984) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 101(44) definition of “state”). 
 35. Codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 36. Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 Laws P.R. 
71, subsequently invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California 
Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1938 (2016).  
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012). 
 38. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1946. 
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worlds: it is not entitled to the benefits of Chapter 9, but remains 
subject to the burdens of Chapter 9;” it is left “in a ‘no man’s land’ 
where its public utilities cannot restructure their debts under either 
federal law or its own law.”39  
For the first time in its history, Puerto Rico defaulted on a $58 
million bond payment in August, 2015.
40
 Another default in May 
2016 heightened fears about Puerto Rico’s ability to make $2 billion 
in future public debt payments due on July 1, 2016.
41
 Puerto Rican 
Governor García Padilla shortly thereafter confirmed these concerns, 
announcing on June 29, 2015 that the Commonwealth’s debts were 
unpayable.
42
 Anxieties over the impending July 1 default were 
especially acute not only because the amount at stake was so 
enormous, but also because $779 million of the total due was owed to 
holders of constitutionally-guaranteed debt.
43
 Indeed, Puerto Rico’s 
missed payment on July 1, 2016 was its first ever default on 
constitutionally-guaranteed debt.
44
 
B. Explaining Puerto Rico’s Economic Decline 
While there is no definitive explanation for Puerto Rico’s 
dramatic decade-long decline, studies identify numerous contributing 
factors. First, Puerto Rico’s weak fiscal discipline, inadequate long-
 
 39. Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 13–14, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (No. 15-233). 
 40. Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico Defaults on Payment Due for Bonds, WALL STREET J., 
Aug. 4, 2015, at C1. 
 41. Jackie Calmes, Treasury Chief Puts a Face on Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2016, at B3 (reporting $422 million default in early May, and $2 billion due in July).  
 42. See Michael Corkery, Puerto Rico Faces its Creditors in Early Debt Resolution Talks, 
N. Y. Times, Jul. 14, 2015, at B1 (reporting Governor’s meeting with investors in New York 
two weeks after the announcement). See also Economy, Debt and Options for Congress: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat’l Resources, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement 
of Alejandro J. García Padilla, Governor of Puerto Rico) [hereinafter Options for Congress 
Hearings]. 
 43. Mary Walsh Williams, Deadline Nears in Puerto Rico, Amid Haggling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2016, at B1. P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 2, provides guarantees for certain “direct 
obligations of the Commonwealth . . . .” See also id. at § 8 (priority for public debt payments if 
available revenues are insufficient to meet appropriations).  
 44. See Heather Gillers & Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico Defaults on Guaranteed Debt, 
WALL STREET J., Jul. 2, 2016, at A3; Steven Mufson, Obama Signs Bill to Help Economy of 
Puerto Rico, WASH. POST, Jul. 1, 2016, at A14 (reporting Puerto Rican Governor’s June 30, 
2016 executive order blocking payments on July 1). 
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term budget planning, budget accounting flaws,
45
 poor cash 
management,
46
 and lack of transparency seriously exacerbated its 
economic crisis and hampered recovery efforts. In addition, Puerto 
Rico’s economic data is disorganized and inadequate. As the Krueger 
Report pointedly observed, “[b]etter statistics are not a luxury. 
Without them the Commonwealth is flying blind and market 
uncertainty about underlying developments is reflected in the risk 
premium on government debt.”47 The New York Federal Reserve 
also concluded that, “the Commonwealth’s slow growth has been 
exacerbated by its inefficient tax system that encourages and rewards 
evasion.”48  
Other internal explanations for Puerto Rico’s economic woes 
include its extremely low labor participation,
49
 at least partially 
attributable to work disincentives triggered by generous welfare 
benefits and partially to hiring disincentives created by high 
minimum wage requirements relative to local averages.
50
 Another 
factor is the extremely high cost of electricity, which weakened 
Puerto Rican manufacturers’ competitiveness.51 Though Puerto 
Rico’s higher reliance on oil may explain at least some of this 
electricity rate differential, another problem is that island electricity is 
provided by the Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority (PREPA), a 
weakly-regulated, “inefficient and overstaffed public enterprise . . . 
using technologies decades out of date.”52 In addition, PREPA’s high 
 
 45. See, e.g., ROADMAP FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 19, at 7 (unrealistic 
revenue estimates, which result in budgets that mask recurring deficits); KRUEGER ET AL., supra 
note 16, at 9 (optimistic revenue projections and systematic understatement of tax refunds due 
the public). 
 46. See, e.g., KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 10 (noting frequent precarious 
government cash deposits, leading to delayed payables, as well as other gimmicks for 
maintaining cash balances).  
 47. Id. at 22–23. 
 48. FED. RES. UPDATE, supra note 18, at 14. 
 49. KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 (“only 40% of the adult population—versus 63% 
on the US mainland—is employed or looking for work . . .”). 
 50. Id. at 6–7. See also FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., REPORT ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF 
PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMY 19 (2012) [hereinafter FED. RES. REPORT].  
 51. FED. RES. REPORT, supra note 50, at 12. 
 52. KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 8. Updating its earlier report, however, the New 
York Federal Reserve commended Puerto Rico for creating a new independent regulatory board 
for PREPA. FED. RES. UPDATE, supra note 18, at 7. See Puerto Rico Energy Transformation 
and RELIEF Act, 2014 P.R. Laws 57 (creating an independent Audit Committee). 
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rates for paying customers are partially attributable to its decades-
long practice of giving free power to “all 78 of Puerto Rico’s 
municipalities, many government-owned enterprises, and even to 
some for-profit businesses . . . .”53 
Of course, the most obvious factor contributing to Puerto Rico’s 
financial crisis is excessive public debt. As Puerto Rico’s 
Government Development Bank (GDB) President dramatically 
testified in 2015, “while the economy has contracted by more than 20 
percent over the past eight years, outstanding public debt has 
increased by more than 60 percent.”54 On the one hand, Puerto Rico’s 
frequent debt rollovers simply resemble those routinely used by the 
United States and other governments to pay off maturing debt.
55
 
Several factors make Puerto Rico’s public debt problems more 
serious, however. First, Puerto Rico uses an unusually large number 
of public corporations, including PREPA, to provide public services 
such as electricity, banking, and health care. In fact, public 
corporation bond issues account for over a third of Puerto Rico’s 
public debt.
56
 Second, the central government frequently extends 
financial support to its struggling public corporations. Ironically, this 
support may have led investors to feel more secure, and thereby 
enhanced the marketing of further public corporation debt even as it 
weakened the central government’s own fiscal circumstances.57 
Moreover, the “off-budget” status of such public corporations’ 
borrowing for purposes of Puerto Rican constitutional debt limits 
further enables public officials to over-borrow with little 
transparency.
58
  
 
 53. Mary Williams Walsh, How Free Electricity Helped Dig $9 Billion Hole in Puerto 
Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2016, at A1. 
 54. Financial and Economic Challenges in Puerto Rico: Hearings Before the S. Finance 
Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Melba Acosta-Febo, Pres., Gov’t Develop. Bank) 
[hereinafter Financial and Economic Challenges Hearings].  
 55. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., FED. RES. UPDATE, supra note 18, at 16 (reporting that public corporation 
and agency debt accounted for 36.4% of total public debt as of December 2013). 
 57. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 14; FED. RES. UPDATE, supra note 18, at 13 (central 
government financial support for public corporations “has reasonably led investors to believe 
that the Commonwealth provides some backing for these entities’ debts”). 
 58. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 13. 
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Though Puerto Rico surely bears significant responsibility, it 
would be unfair to cast all blame for the financial crisis at its feet. 
The island has faced economic and demographic shocks over which it 
had little control, such as steep housing price declines, high prices for 
imported oil, high transportation costs,
59
 outmigration and population 
loss, and—of course—a major global recession.60 In addition, several 
U.S. tax and other policies may have significantly contributed to 
Puerto Rico’s public debt problems and general economic decline.61 
Federal government acceptance of at least partial responsibility for 
Puerto Rico’s economic woes would add a new element to the policy 
debate over whether—and to what extent—the federal government 
should offer emergency assistance. These issues are considered more 
fully below in sections addressing Puerto Rico’s unique position 
within the American political system and its implications for 
financial intervention policies.  
C. The U.S. Federal Government Response 
Though U.S. officials were aware of Puerto Rico’s growing 
economic problems at least as early as 2013,
62
 significant 
congressional interest began only in 2015, when the U.S. House of 
Representatives held hearing after hearing without any formal 
action.
63
 The Senate held further hearings later in the year,
64
 but 
 
 59. Some of this cost is endemic to economically and geographically-isolated island 
economies in general. Puerto Rico’s import costs are at least double those of neighboring 
islands, however, because it is required by U.S. law to use exclusively U.S. ships and crews. 
KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 8. See also infra notes 211–26 and accompanying text. 
 60. See generally KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–8.  
 61. See infra notes 186–229 and accompanying text. 
 62. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Worsening Debt Crisis Threatens Puerto Rico, Oct. 
8, 2013, at B1 (Puerto Rican officials’ meetings with “members of Congress and Treasury 
officials, providing details of the fiscal changes they have pushed through and discussing what 
else might be needed”). 
 63. See, e.g., The Need for the Establishment of a Puerto Rico Financial Stability and 
Economic Growth Authority: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, Subcomm. 
on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015); The U.S. Treasury 
Department’s Analysis of the Situation in Puerto Rico: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Natural Resources, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter Treasury Department Analysis Hearings]; 
Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015: Hearings before the H. Judiciary Comm., 
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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partisans in Congress were unable to agree on a federal response.
65
 In 
presenting his proposals for immediate congressional action in late 
2015, President Obama presented a dire picture: 
 [t]he 3.5 million Americans living in Puerto Rico have 
endured a decade of economic stagnation. Since 2006, Puerto 
Rico’s economy has shrunk by more than 10 percent and shed 
more than 250,000 jobs. More than 45 percent of the 
Commonwealth’s residents live in poverty – the highest 
poverty rate of any state or territory – and its 11.6 percent 
unemployment rate is more than twice the national level. These 
challenges have sparked the largest wave of outmigration since 
the 1950’s, and the pace continues to accelerate. . . . Puerto 
Rico’s government is out of cash and running out of options.66 
Proposed legislation that would have amended Chapter 9 
empowering Puerto Rico to authorize municipal bankruptcies was 
never enacted.
67
  
D. PROMESA’s Promise 
1. Enactment and Objectives 
As the July 1, 2016 deadline for $2 billion in required public bond 
payments loomed,
68
 administration officials became increasingly 
blunt, arguing to Congress that “the [Puerto Rican] government itself 
could be forced to shut down entirely” absent emergency 
 
 64. See, e.g., Financial and Economic Challenges Hearings, supra note 54; Options for 
Congress Hearings, supra note 42; Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Problems Hearings, supra note 10. 
 65. See, e.g., Mary Walsh Williams, A Chilly Reception, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2015, at 
B1. 
 66. ROADMAP FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 19, at 1. See also KRUEGER ET 
AL., supra note 16, at 7 (reporting Puerto Rico’s population loss “at a rate of about 1% per 
year–ten times more than West Virginia, the only US state with subzero growth”); Jaison R. 
Abel & Richard Deitz, The Causes and Consequences of Puerto Rico’s Declining Population, 
20 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., no. 4, 2014, at 1. FED. RES. UPDATE, supra note 18, at 4, 
n.9 (reporting Puerto Rico’s estimated population decline as seventh highest among countries 
worldwide).  
 67. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act, S. 1774, 114th Cong. (2015); Puerto 
Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act, H.R. 870, 114th Cong. (2015); Puerto Rico Chapter 9 
Uniformity Act of 2014, H.R. 5305, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 68. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments 227 
 
 
congressional action.
69
 In a last-minute compromise, Congress 
enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act (PROMESA)
70
 just days before the July 1 deadline.
71
 
The statute embodies two key objectives, both under the jurisdiction 
of a new, presidentially-appointed Financial Oversight and 
Management Board.
72
 The first is for Puerto Rico—under the Board’s 
oversight and control—to achieve future fiscal responsibility and 
stability, economic growth, and access to capital markets.
73
 The 
second objective is more direct intervention to manage and facilitate 
resolution of Puerto Rico’s immediate debt crisis. Mindful that 
arrangements for Puerto Rico might be perceived as setting precedent 
for troubled U.S. states, and sensitive to potential political backlash 
from voters angered by “bailouts,” however, Congress conspicuously 
did not include any emergency funding.
74
  
 
 69. Treasury Department Analysis Hearings, supra note 63 (testimony of Antonio Weiss, 
U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Counselor to Sec.).  
 70. PROMESA, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 (2016). For an overall description and analysis 
of PROMESA, see D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44532, THE PUERTO RICO 
OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT (PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S. 2328) 
(2016) [hereinafter AUSTIN, PROMESA OVERVIEW]. 
 71. See Mike DeBonis & Steven Mufson, Puerto Rico Fiscal-Rescue Bill Clears Congress 
Two Days Before Debt Cliff, WASH. POST, Jun. 30, 2016, at A15.  
 72. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b) (establishing Oversight Board). Though intended for Puerto Rico, 
PROMESA broadly applies to any “territory for which an Oversight Board has been 
established” pursuant to § 2121(b). 48 U.S.C. § 2104(8). Congress has not established an 
Oversight Board for any territory other than Puerto Rico. 
 73. Id. at § 2121(a) (purpose of Board). See also PREPA Hearings, supra note 29 
(testimony of José B. Carrión III, Chair, Finan. Oversight & Management Bd.); id. at §§ 2141–
43 (Board responsibility for approving fiscal plans and certifying compliance with statutorily-
defined fiscal standards, certification of budget compliance with fiscal plan, authority to reduce 
budget expenditures, institute certain hiring freezes, and prohibit government instrumentalities 
from entering contracts or engaging in financial transactions in event of noncompliance). Many 
Puerto Ricans resent PROMESA’s imposition of federal government control, complaining of 
ongoing “colonialism” and referring to the new Board as a “junta.” Mary Williams Walsh, New 
Puerto Rico Debt Relief Law Stirs Colonial Resentments, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1, 2016, at B1. 
 74. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Senate Votes to Approve Puerto Rico Relief Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2016, at B1 (“The rescue package will not prevent Puerto Rico from missing the 
payment due . . . , and Republican congressional leaders labored to reassure conservatives that 
the bill is not a bailout.”). Though some may disagree over labels, I define “bailout” as “a form 
of government assistance or intervention specifically designed or intended to assist enterprises 
facing financial distress and to prevent enterprise failure.” Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert 
Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 960 (1992). In other words, a 
successful bailout might be accomplished at no cost, or sometimes even at a profit. See Block, 
Measuring Costs, supra note 2, at 163–65. 
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Rather than invoke its Bankruptcy Clause constitutional powers,
75
 
Congress instead used its Territories Clause authority
76
 to establish 
two new emergency debt readjustment tools, both ultimately subject 
to Oversight Board control: (1) a largely out-of-court process for 
negotiating voluntary restructuring agreements;
77
 and (2) a court-
supervised, bankruptcy-like process.
78
 
2. PROMESA Title VII: Voluntary Debt Restructuring  
Title VII’s new “creditor collective action” rules provide at least 
some structure to the previously ad hoc process for voluntary bond 
restructuring. Its procedures require: (1) negotiations between the 
bond issuing entity and distinct bondholder pools representing 
different types of creditor interests;
79
 (2) certification and acceptance 
of proposed debt restructuring terms by the Oversight Board;
80
 and 
(3) favorable super-majority vote of qualified bondholders in each 
pool.
81
 Title VII is perhaps best understood in light of sovereign debt 
crisis management problems since the mid-1990s, when many 
countries—and territories such as Puerto Rico—began to generate 
capital primarily by selling bonds, most of which are traded by 
investors on secondary markets, rather than borrow through 
 
 75. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (empowering Congress to make “uniform [l]aws on the subject 
of [b]ankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
 76. 48 U.S.C. § 2191(b)(2) (“Congress enacts this chapter pursuant to article IV, section 3 
of the Constitution of the United States, which provides Congress the power to dispose of and 
make all needful rules and regulations for territories.”).  
 77. 48 U.S.C. §§ 2231–32 (title VII) (“Creditor Collective Action”). 
 78. 48 U.S.C. §§ 2161–77 (title III) (“Adjustments of Debts”). The federal Bankruptcy 
Code includes procedures for either liquidation (11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7)), or 
reorganization and potential rehabilitation (11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11)), of private 
insolvent businesses. Given that territories cannot be liquidated, PROMESA’s title III 
provisions are modelled largely after Chapter 11. Indeed, title III makes numerous general and 
Chapter 11-specific federal bankruptcy provisions explicitly applicable. Id. at § 2161(1), (b). 
 79. 48 U.S.C. § 2231(d) (pools established by Board in consultation with the government 
bond issuing entity). 
 80. 48 U.S.C. § 2231(g) (requiring certification that debt modifications are in creditors’ 
best interests and in compliance with other requirements specified in id. at § 2124(i).  
 81. Id. at § 2231(j). The complex voting rules require that modifications be approved by 
the holders of not less than a majority of the total aggregate outstanding principal for each pool, 
and by holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding principal within the pool who actually 
vote. Id.  
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syndicated commercial bank loans.
82
 In this new market environment, 
distressed sovereigns frequently face the challenge of negotiating 
debt modification agreements with large numbers of bondholders 
with diverging interests.
83
 Of particular concern is the potential for 
“holdouts”—bondholders who refuse to negotiate, preferring instead 
to sue for full payment. Some fear that recent court rulings protecting 
the payment rights of bondholders who did not consent over those 
who voluntarily agreed to sovereign debt restructuring will further 
embolden holdouts, “exacerbate collective action problems and, 
accordingly, make the sovereign debt restructuring process more 
complicated.”84  
As collective action problems increasingly stymied successful ad 
hoc restructuring negotiations with sovereign bondholders, the IMF 
found itself with few alternatives other than to make large loans to 
distressed sovereigns or simply allow them to fend for themselves.
85
 
In fact, unpopular IMF bailouts of debtor nations between 1995 and 
2002 ultimately led to two major reform models for sovereign debt 
resolution: (1) a statutory or treaty-based framework for formal 
international bankruptcy;
86
 and (2) a private, contract-based 
approach, which focuses primarily on including “collective action 
clauses” (CACs) in sovereign debt contracts. These clauses generally 
enable “a qualified majority of bondholders (typically seventy-five 
percent) to bind all bondholders within the same issue to the financial 
 
 82. See, e.g., Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 308–10 (2005); W. Mark C. Weidenmaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s 
History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 56 (2013). 
 83. See, e.g., Anne O. Krueger & Sean Hagan, Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective, 
6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 203, 210 (2005). 
 84. MARTIN A. WEISS & ARLENE WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31451, 
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: ALTERNATIVES TO “BAILOUTS,” HARDSHIPS 
AND CONTAGION 94 (2013). See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F. 3d 246 (2d 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 
727 F. 3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (Supreme Court refusal to 
hear appeals on lower court rulings enjoining Argentina from making payments on restructured 
debt until holdouts were paid in full).  
 85. See, e.g., MANAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 84, at 1.  
 86. The most prominent of these proposals is the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM). See MANAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 84, at 
11–14; Hagan, supra note 82, at 335–402. 
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terms of a restructuring. . . .”87 Under such CACs, investors 
contractually agree ex ante to be bound by the results of a bondholder 
vote pursuant to contractually-specified procedures in the event that 
sovereign debt adjustments become necessary. As such, CACs ideally 
prevent holdouts from interfering with supermajority (or sometimes 
majority) bondholder agreements to reduce the distressed 
government’s debt burden, thereby increasing public-sector 
involvement (PSI) in burden sharing,
88
 and limiting the need for 
taxpayer-funded bailout-type assistance.  
Perhaps the most notable feature of title VII is its potential—
loosely modelled after the CAC approach—for binding non-
consenting bondholders within each pool to debt modifications 
approved by supermajority vote,
89
 even though—in contrast to the 
sovereign-debt CAC model on which it is based—the bondholders 
did not contractually agree to any such collective action terms in 
advance. In other words, title VII permits involuntary retroactive 
changes to individual bondholder rights; it is not really a contract-
based approach at all.
90
 Moreover, PROMESA’s use of relatively 
narrowly-defined bondholder voting pools is oddly inconsistent with 
the modern CAC trend, which is to aggregate voting across different 
bond series rather than count votes on a “series-by-series” basis.91 As 
the IMF recently explained, series-by-series CACs are not very 
effective against holdouts because they “allow the possibility that . . . 
a group of creditors can obtain a ‘blocking position’ in a particular 
series.”92 Raising similar concerns about PROMESA title VII’s 
voting pools, Obama Administration officials testified that the 
complexity of Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonded debt and the large 
 
 87. Hagan, supra note 82, at 317 (describing this as the most important of two different 
CAC types). For more on CACs, see Weidenmaier & Gulati, supra note 82; Anna Gelpern & 
Mitu Gulati, The Wonder Clause, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 367 (2013). 
 88. See, e.g., Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 87, at 374. 
 89. See supra note 81. 
 90. AUSTIN, PROMESA OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 26. 
 91. AUSTIN, PROMESA OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 27 (noting PROMESA’s contrast to 
trends to create larger, aggregated pools to facilitate consensus on restructuring).  
 92. INT’L MONETARY FUND, STRENGTHENING THE CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK TO 
ADDRESS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROBLEMS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 18 (Oct. 
2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf. Responding to this concern, 
the European Union in 2013 began mandating aggregate-vote CACs for Eurozone sovereign 
debt issues. Id. at 19.  
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number and size of voting pools would make it “nearly impossible to 
reach the super-majority required for restructuring.”93  
3. Title III: Bankruptcy-Like Debt Restructuring  
In some respects, title III’s formal “Adjustments of Debts” 
process affords even broader protection than Puerto Rico would have 
gotten from an expansion of Chapter 9 bankruptcy authority to the 
territory.
94
 Unlike Chapter 9, which does not allow state-level 
bankruptcy proceedings,
95
 title III treats the Puerto Rican government 
itself as a potential debtor eligible to participate in the formal debt 
restructuring process.
96
 On the other hand, Puerto Rico has little say 
over the title III process, which is controlled almost entirely by the 
Oversight Board. Only the Board, for example, can commence a title 
III restructuring action by filing a petition in federal district court.
97
 
In any case, the Board cannot file a petition unless five or more 
members of the Board (out of seven total) vote to issue a 
“restructuring certification.”98 These and other procedural obstacles 
could make it more difficult for Puerto Rico to use the title III 
restructuring process. Making a similar argument, Obama 
Administration officials testified that “the process for entering 
restructuring should not require a super-majority vote of the Board. A 
minority of the Board should not have veto power at the critical 
junction when all other options have been exhausted.”99 
 
 93. AUSTIN, PROMESA OVERVIEW, supra note 70, at 27 (referring to Treasury Department 
testimony before the House Committee on Natural Resources). See also, id. (referring to 
testimony that Title VII “imposes an unworkable, mandatory process that will only delay ability 
to reach a comprehensive resolution.”). 
 94. Though clearly modelled on federal bankruptcy laws, see supra note 78, title III 
generally refers to the process as “restructuring;” not “bankruptcy.” See also supra notes 36–39, 
and 67, and accompanying texts regarding political efforts to extend Chapter 9-type municipal 
bankruptcy authority to Puerto Rico. 
 95. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 96. 48 U.S.C. § 2162 (“Who may be a debtor”). 
 97. 48 U.S.C. § 2164(a). PROMESA does not provide for proceedings in bankruptcy 
court. 
 98. 48 U.S.C. § 2146. 
 99. Discussion Draft of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability 
Act: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of 
Antonio Weiss, U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Counselor to Sec.).  
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4. Policy Priorities and PROMESA’s Potential 
In the end, PROMESA borrows from both contract-based and 
court-supervised debt restructuring models, effectively forging a 
hybrid procedural approach to restructuring Puerto Rico’s otherwise 
unpayable debt.
100
 Despite this mix, PROMESA’s statutory language 
strongly indicates a preference for privately-negotiated solutions. Key 
to this preference is a restriction limiting the Board to issuing a title 
III restructuring certification for an eligible Puerto Rican bond issuer 
only after determining, in its sole discretion, that “the entity has made 
good-faith efforts to reach a consensual restructuring with 
creditors . . . .”101 Although Puerto Rican officials might argue that 
negotiations with creditors over the past several years—presumably 
in good faith—already satisfy the good faith requirement, 
PROMESA’s hybrid structure suggests—and the Oversight Board 
Chair’s recent congressional testimony confirm—that the Board will 
first require Puerto Rico to try title VII private negotiations before 
turning to title III. In recent congressional testimony, the Oversight 
Board Chair reported a major PROMESA milestone: the Board’s 
March 13, 2017 certification of Puerto Rico’s amended fiscal plan,102 
further explaining that—with this certified fiscal plan in place—the 
Board’s primary focus would be to secure consensual restructurings 
under title VII.
103
 Puerto Rico’s new governor, who took office in 
January 2017, also prefers to work first toward consensual 
agreements under title VII, for example, to extract even greater 
concessions from PREPA bondholders than those included in an 
earlier restructuring agreement.
104   
 
 100. See supra note 42 (announcement regarding unpayable debt). 
 101. 48 U.S.C. § 2146 (a)(1). 
 102. See PREPA Hearings, supra note 29 (testimony of José B. Carrión III, Chair, Finan. 
Oversight & Management Bd.). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. (testimony of Governor Ricardo Antonio Rosselló Nevares). See also PREPA 
Hearings, supra note 29 (testimony of Luis Benítez Hernández, Chair, PREPA Governing 
Board) (describing restructuring negotiations and agreement with PREPA creditors); Matt Wirz 
& Andrew Scurria, Puerto Rico Deal Could be Altered – Governor Weighs Asking Creditors 
for More Concessions in Bond Agreement, WALL STREET J., Jan. 28, 2017, at B9. 
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While PROMESA did not prevent Puerto Rico’s substantial 
default on constitutionally-guaranteed debt,
105
 its temporary 
automatic stay on litigation against Puerto Rican government entities 
at least bought time for Puerto Rico and the Oversight Board to begin 
their work without the distraction of litigation that otherwise would 
have ensued as creditors rushed to courthouses to protect their 
claims.
106
 Also on the positive side, the Oversight Board’s recent 
certification of Puerto Rico’s amended fiscal plan—along with 
PROMESA’s fiscal sustainability measures more generally—will 
hopefully increase investor confidence and calm otherwise chilly 
markets. In addition, PROMESA’s emergency debt restructuring 
tools offer at least some structure and procedures for adjusting Puerto 
Rico’s unsustainable debt obligations. Moreover, unlike true 
sovereign debt holders, for whom there is no formal international 
bankruptcy or title III-like alternative to voluntary restructuring, 
Puerto Rico’s quasi-sovereign bondholders now have additional 
incentive to participate in negotiations for fear that they may be 
worse if the issuer can use the title III court-supervised process as a 
backstop in the event that voluntary negotiations fail. To the extent 
that Puerto Rico can use title VII to persuade creditors to further 
share any significant portion of its unsustainable public debt burden, 
the territory will improve its chances for economic recovery, and—
more importantly—reduce economic and social burdens on the 
general public, and lessen the need for outside assistance.
107
  
On the other hand, for a voluntary restructuring agreement under 
title VII to be binding on non-consenting bondholders of the issuer, it 
must not only be approved by a separate supermajority vote of each 
pool with respect to changes affecting creditors in that pool,
108
 but 
must satisfy other requirements. PROMESA title VII modifications 
are not binding, for example, until: (1) the holders of the right to vote 
 
 105. See supra note 44. 
 106. Originally set to expire on February 15, 2017, 48 U.S.C. §2194(d), the temporary stay 
was extended by the Oversight Board until May 1, 2017. PREPA Hearings, supra note 29 
(testimony of José B. Carrión III, Chair, Finan. Oversight & Management Bd.). 
 107. Whether through title VII or title III, I believe that some significant portion of the 
financial sacrifice necessary for Puerto Rico to emerge with a sustainable debt profile should be 
borne by those who purchased Puerto Rican bonds at extraordinarily steep discounts. 
 108. See supra note 81. 
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in every pool of the issuer have approved modifications under the 
applicable voting procedures; (2) the Oversight Board makes further 
required certifications and submits them to the federal district court 
for Puerto Rico; and (3) the court enters a ruling that the approved 
modifications are conclusive and binding.
109
 Though Puerto Rico 
may have some success renegotiating debt burdens with respect to 
lower priority bonds issued by its public corporations, the greatest 
challenge to title VII’s success is likely to be the holders of 
constitutionally-guaranteed general obligation bonds backed by the 
full faith and credit of the Puerto Rican government itself.
110
 Title VII 
modifications would not only retroactively change these 
bondholders’ contract terms, but also would alter the constitutionally-
guaranteed status of their investments. This group of bondholders is 
likely not only likely to resist voluntary restructuring, but also to 
challenge the title III restructuring process through litigation. In other 
words, title VII’s potential success hinges on the substantial buy-in of 
those holding general obligations bonds. Though I hope to be proven 
wrong, I am not optimistic that the unwieldy title VII process will 
result in fully successful voluntary agreements with creditors on debt 
modifications before the short-lived automatic stay on creditor 
litigation expires.
111
 One additional factor that may limit 
PROMESA’s promise is its failure to address the island’s inadequate 
federal Medicaid funding, which is critical to remedying Puerto 
Rico’s short- and long-term budgetary and economic problems.”112 
Puerto Rico’s financial problems are far from over, and Congress 
may face continued pressure for assistance, including possible 
 
 109. 48 U.S.C. § 2231(m). 
 110. Among the required principles for establishing title VII pools is identifying separate 
pools based on the relative priority or security arrangements for different bonds, including 
“[b]onds that have been issued as general obligations . . . .” 48 U.S.C. § 2231(d)(3)(A). In other 
words, holders of high priority, general obligation bonds will be in a separate pool for 
negotiation purposes. 
 111. See supra note 106. Title VII’s potentially positive impact is also limited because it 
does not provide a structure for negotiations with stakeholders other than bondholders.  
 112. EDWIN PARK, CENTER ON BUDGET POLICY & PRIORITIES, ADDRESSING PUERTO 
RICO’S MEDICAID FUNDING SHORTFALLS WOULD HELP ENSURE FISCAL STABILITY AND 
GROWTH 1 (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-19-16health.pdf 
[hereinafter MEDICAID FUNDING SHORTFALLS]. See also infra notes 221–27, and accompanying 
text (discussing the debate over the adequacy of federal funding for Puerto Rico’s Medicaid 
program). 
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requests for direct funding. Indeed, at the new Board’s first 
substantive meeting, Puerto Rico’s governor already was arguing that 
the island will “still need the assistance of the federal government to 
bring this economic and humanitarian crisis to an end.”113 Rather than 
pretend that it will never provide financial assistance to Puerto Rico 
or to a U.S. state in the event of a similar emergency, Congress 
should use the recent Puerto Rico episode as an opportunity to focus 
attention on U.S. policy regarding federal rescue intervention to aid 
distressed subnational state and territorial governments.  
II. SOVEREIGNTY-BASED ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 
A. The Quasi-Sovereign U.S. States 
The U.S. Constitution created distinct national and state-level 
governments, yet left many unanswered questions on the scope of 
federal and state authority. Though some might despair of such 
constitutional imprecision, the flexibility it provides actually may be 
one of American federalism’s greatest virtues. According to 
Woodrow Wilson, for example: 
The question of the relation of the States to the federal 
government is the cardinal question of our constitutional 
system. . . . It cannot, indeed, be settled by one generation 
because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage 
of our political and economic development gives it a new 
aspect, makes it a new question.
114
  
Despite American federalism’s nuanced and evolving interpretation 
of relative federal and state powers, U.S. states clearly have many 
sovereign-like features, including autonomous executive, legislative, 
and judicial government branches, and independent taxing, spending, 
 
 113. Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Said to Face ‘Death Spiral’ Over Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2016, at B3 (quoting Governor Alejandro García Padilla). 
 114. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173 
(1911). As Professor Kenneth Dam argues, American federalism’s fluidity is especially evident 
with respect to fiscal matters. Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 271, 273 (1977). 
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and borrowing authority. At the same time, several U.S. state 
characteristics are clearly inconsistent with broad sovereignty 
notions. Perhaps most important, federal power constitutionally 
preempts some state regulatory authority under the federal 
preemption doctrine.
115
 At best, then, states can be described as 
“quasi-sovereign.”116 
Even after a long post-New Deal period of expansively-defined 
federal regulatory power,
117
 notions of “state sovereignty” have 
retained powerful rhetorical and emotive force since the republic’s 
inception, especially among those advocating greater state 
autonomy.
118
 The Supreme Court’s renewed focus on state 
sovereignty in its “new federalism” decisions since the 1990s 
reinvigorated such sovereignty-based “states’ rights” arguments.119 
Modern Supreme Court rhetoric on state sovereign immunity also 
emphasizes the doctrine’s primary function as “afford[ing] the States 
the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.”120 Consistently 
applied, the same autonomy and dignity arguments used to keep the 
federal government and courts out of state affairs in stable times also 
support a hands-off approach during times of economic instability. In 
 
 115. A broad discussion of the complex, evolving, and sometimes ambiguous nature of 
federal preemption doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. As samples from the vast 
academic literature, see, for example, Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Stephan A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
767 (1994); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).  
 116. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign 
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 891 (2012).  
 117. Some say that the Court during this period so broadly interpreted federal authority that 
“virtually no substantive area of law [was] beyond the national government’s reach.” Deborah 
Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1563, 1565 (1994).  
 118. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 12 (2008). 
 119. Examples of the exhaustive “new federalism” or “federalist revival” literature include 
EUGENE BOYD & MICHAEL K. FAUNTROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30772, AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM, 1776-2000: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 15–18 (2000); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a 
New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1133 (2000).  
 120. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002). See also 
Judith Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in 
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1923 (2003); Peter J. Smith, States as 
Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003). 
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other words, states should both enjoy the full benefits and suffer the 
negative consequences of state-level policy choices.  
Upon closer examination, though, sovereignty-based arguments 
for a presumption against federal assistance to financially-troubled 
states are weaker than they appear at first blush. First, as many 
scholars argue, constitutional state sovereignty notions are 
inconsistent with the modern political environment, which—at least 
since the New Deal—has instantiated a more cooperative federalist 
reality of substantially-intertwined federal and state policymaking 
and administration of government programs.
121
 Several scholars, for 
example, note modern tension “between the constitutional rhetoric 
and political reality of federal-state relations.”122 In any event, 
Professor David Super argues that traditional constitutional 
federalism principles, which focus on federal regulatory power over 
the states, are not as well suited to address questions about federal-
state fiscal relationships.
123
 At least with respect to the latter, which 
Super refers to as fiscal federalism, “[t]he New Deal amended our 
implicit fiscal constitution by recognizing a new federal 
responsibility to provide countercyclical assistance.”124  
Second, using “hard core” state sovereignty ideas to insist that 
states take full responsibility for their own financial messes fails to 
account for the unusual quasi-sovereign nature of state governments, 
which fiscally depend upon central government grants-in-aid in ways 
that true national sovereigns do not.
125
 States have no power to 
 
 121. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2001). 
 122. Id. at 665. See also Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of 
America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (2001) (describing a nostalgic 
“puppy federalism,” used “to convince ourselves that we have not altered the conception of the 
government that the Framers maintained, when, of course, we have; that we are not a 
bureaucratized administrative state, when, of course, we are; and that we are a geographically 
diverse nation, . . . when, of course, we are highly homogenized.”). 
 123. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005).  
 124. Id. at 2575.  
 125. See, e.g., John Joseph Wallis & Wallace E. Oates, The Impact of the New Deal on 
American Federalism, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 155, 156 (Michael D. Bordo, Claudia 
Goldin & Eugene N White eds., 1998). Indeed, grants to state and local governments have 
increased in total outlay and number since the 1930s. See ROBERT J. DILGER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40638, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: AN HISTORICAL 
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control the money supply, and more generally lack access to the 
kinds of financial resources that the federal government may bring to 
bear when necessary.
126
 Third, even though federal and state 
governments have similar debt issuing authority, virtually all states 
face balanced budget requirements and other borrowing constraints 
that do not apply to the federal government.
127
 In the end, I contend 
that the concept of state sovereignty—standing alone—does not 
adequately support a strong presumption against federal bailout-type 
assistance to state governments.  
B. Puerto Rico’s Uniquely Hybrid Quasi-Sovereignty  
Puerto Rico occupies an unusual space in the international and 
American federalist firmaments. As just one example, U.S. tax rules 
inconsistently treat Puerto Rico as sometimes foreign, sometimes a 
state, and sometimes a hybrid somewhere in between. The 
congressional Joint Tax Committee, for example, reports that: 
Although Puerto Rico is generally treated as a foreign country 
for U.S. tax purposes, a person born in Puerto Rico is typically 
treated as a U.S. citizen for U.S. tax purposes. As a result of 
the hybrid foreign-domestic treatment, the general principles of 
U.S. taxation are qualified by many special rules . . . [which] 
have the effect of dividing tax authority between the U.S. 
Federal government and the government of Puerto Rico.
128
 
Another example is that despite its resemblance to emerging-market 
sovereign nations, Puerto Rico’s status as a U.S. territory makes it 
ineligible for a variety of formal and informal international assistance 
 
PERSPECTIVE ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 5 tbl.2 (2015) (total outlays); id. at 10 tbl.4 (total 
numbers). 
 126. Super, for example, identifies “superior capacity” as a model of federalism that “calls 
for the federal government to marshal its powerful fiscal resources and assist states with 
projects that they would have difficulty handling on their own.” Super, supra note 123, at 2574.  
 127. See DAVID M. PRIMO, RULES AND RESTRAINTS: GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE 
DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS 82–104 (2007); David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: 
Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 755 (2010). 
 128. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-41-12, FEDERAL TAX LAWS AND ISSUES RELATED TO 
THE UNITED STATES TERRITORIES 24 (2012) [hereinafter TAX LAWS RELATED TO 
TERRITORIES].  
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programs, available primarily through the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
129
 At the same time, Congress denies Puerto Rico access 
to the same Chapter 9 federal bankruptcy law protections available to 
U.S. states.
130
 As Joseph Stiglitz and Mark Medesh observed: “[t]he 
commonwealth of Puerto Rico is neither fish nor fowl in the 
constitutional order . . . .”131 
The most fundamental difference between Puerto Rican and U.S. 
state status is the underlying source of governance authority. Aside 
from a brief period of military rule after the United States acquired 
Puerto Rico at the end of the Spanish American War in 1898,
132
 
Congress has exercised or delegated regulatory authority over Puerto 
Rico under the U.S. Constitution’s Territories Clause.133 And, until 
2016, the congressional policy trajectory had been to gradually 
increase Puerto Rico’s self-governance rights.134 Thus, with the 
exception of recent federal oversight controls under PROMESA,
135
 
Puerto Rico today enjoys autonomy and self-governance rights 
largely similar to those of the states.
136
 Like states, for example, 
 
 129. Matt Wirz & Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico, Investors Enlist Ex-IMF Officials, WALL 
STREET J., Apr. 13, 2015, at C1. (“As a U.S. commonwealth, the island . . . doesn’t qualify for 
IMF aid, but the excessive borrowing, inconsistent financial reporting and low tax collection 
that landed Puerto Rico in hot water are common in the developing countries that IMF 
economists deal with.”). Yet, Puerto Rico is recognized as an independent country eligible to 
compete in the Olympic Games. See, e.g., Charles R. Venator Santiago, Countering 
Kulturkampf Politics through Critique and Justice Pedagogy, 50 VILL. L. REV. 749, 770 (2005) 
(“Puerto Rican Olympic teams regularly challenge the United States in the international arena 
as sovereign opponents.”). 
 130. See supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. 
 131. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Mark Medish, What the United States Owes Puerto Rico, WALL 
STREET J., Aug. 13, 2015, at A13. 
 132. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain 
(Treaty of Paris), art II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343 (Spanish cession of Porto 
Rico [sic] to U.S.). On the history and evolution of Puerto Rico’s status, see generally José A. 
Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United 
States Citizenship of Puerto Rican Citizens, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391 (1978). 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United 
States.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868–69 (2016) (describing 
evolution of self-governance rights). See also generally Cabranes, supra note 132.  
 135. See supra notes 70–112 and accompanying text. 
 136. Congress authorized the Puerto Rican people to adopt their own constitution in 1950. 
An Act to provide for the organization of a constitutional government by the people of Puerto 
Rico, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950), and approved the new constitution of the 
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Puerto Rico has independent executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government, independent taxing, spending, and 
borrowing authority, and federal courts generally recognize it as a 
“state” for sovereign immunity purposes.137  
Despite surface appearances, however, the relative “quasi-
sovereignties” of Puerto Rico and the U.S. states differ in important 
ways. First, the statutory U.S. citizenship available to Puerto Rican 
residents since 1917 differs from the constitutional citizenship 
available to those born in the fifty states or the District of Columbia, 
or admitted to the United States as citizens.
138
 Perhaps most 
significant, U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico cannot vote in U.S. 
presidential elections.
139
 Moreover, unlike U.S. state citizens, Puerto 
Ricans are not represented in Congress by members with full voting 
rights.
140
 Though Puerto Rico is considered a “state” for purposes of 
many federal programs, it is explicitly excluded or treated differently 
with respect to others.
141
  
 
“Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” in 1952 on condition that any amendments or revisions be 
consistent with the congressional approval resolution, the U.S. Constitution, and other specified 
U.S. laws. Act of Jul. 3, 1952, 66 Stat. 327. See also Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The 
Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status 
Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1158 (2009) [hereinafter Lawson & Sloane] (noting that 
Congress has not interfered with Puerto Rico’s “de facto” self-governance). 
 137. See, e.g., Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Service, 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983) (“Puerto 
Rico, despite the lack of formal statehood, enjoys the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment in all 
respects.”) (citations omitted). 
 138. 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (“All persons born in Puerto Rico . . . and subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States are citizens of the United States at birth.”). See also Sam Erman, Citizens of 
Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1238 (2014) 
(noting distinction between statutory and constitutional citizenship).  
 139. Technically, “[t]he territories can—and, currently, each of the five territories does—
participate in presidential primaries, but the territories cannot participate in the general election 
for president.” CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PUERTO RICO, 
REPORT TO HOUSE AND SENATE 82, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL TASK 
FORCE REPORT]. See also Igartua-de-la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 146 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting constitutional right to vote claim of U.S. citizen residing in Puerto Rico).  
 140. U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, do elect a single delegate to the House of 
Representatives, “who (under current House rules . . .) can introduce legislation, serve on House 
committees, and vote on legislation at the committee stage. However, the territorial delegates 
cannot vote on legislation on the floor of the House. The territories do not elect U.S. senators.” 
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 82. 
 141. Id. at 95–111 (Appendix 2 (“Federal Programs under Which Puerto Rico Receives 
Differential Treatment”). See also infra notes 175–81 and 211–26 and accompanying texts. 
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 Serious debate over the precise nature of Puerto Rico’s political 
and legal status has simmered since the effective date of its 1952 
Constitution. Whatever Puerto Rico’s practical political status, the 
Supreme Court recently settled the constitutional question. Though it 
acknowledged “Puerto Rico’s transformative constitutional moment” 
in 1952, the Court nonetheless rejected the idea that the Puerto Rican 
Constitution or the “commonwealth” label significantly changed 
Puerto Rico’s status. The Court in Sánchez Valle held that—unlike 
U.S. states, which retained inherent sovereign powers not delegated 
to the federal government when they joined the Union—Puerto Rico 
has been—and continues to be—subject to regulation by Congress: 
“[t]he island’s Constitution, significant though it is, does not break 
the chain.”142 In other words, Puerto Rico’s quasi-sovereign qualities 
may be ephemeral; they remain vulnerable to congressional change at 
any time.  
 As the Court observed in Sánchez Valle, among the few things 
that can be said with absolute certainty regarding Puerto Rico’s status 
is that it “boasts ‘a relationship to the United States that has no 
parallel in our history.’”143 In Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 
also decided in 2016, the Supreme Court held that Congress may treat 
Puerto Rico as a “state” preempted from enacting its own municipal 
debt restructuring rules, and yet not a “state” eligible to authorize its 
municipalities access to Chapter 9 bankruptcy protections.
144
 These 
recent Supreme Court decisions, together with PROMESA, make it 
clear that Puerto Rico remains subject to discretionary congressional 
authority, and that Congress will turn to its Territories Clause to 
regulate Puerto Rican affairs as it deems necessary.  
Ultimately, the force of sovereignty-based arguments against a 
federal bailout of Puerto Rico is limited for many of the reasons 
 
 142. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2016). 
Referring to statutory grants of “autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States[,]” the 
Court acknowledged Puerto Rico as “‘sovereign’ in one commonly understood sense of that 
term.” Id. at 1874. Nonetheless, the Court held that Puerto Rico was not sovereign under the 
narrow test used for double jeopardy purposes, which focuses solely on the ultimate source of 
prosecutorial power. Id. at 1876. 
 143. Id. at 1876 (citing Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 596 (1976)). 
 144. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016). 
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described above with respect to the U.S. states.
145
 Like the states, for 
example, Puerto Rico relies on substantial federal grants-in-aid,
146
 
lacks monetary authority, has access to fewer resources, and is 
constrained by balanced-budget requirements.
147
 In fact, the 
sovereignty-based case against bailouts arguably is even weaker for 
Puerto Rico than the states because Puerto Rico simply is not 
autonomous or independent in the same way that states are. While 
Congress generally has been content to keep its distance, Puerto 
Rico’s self-governance rights are subject to congressional whim. To 
be clear, I believe that there should be a presumption against federal 
bailout-type assistance to Puerto Rico. My argument here is simply 
that the rationale for such a presumption cannot be built around 
conceptions of Puerto Rico as a self-governing, independent, or 
quasi-sovereign entity in whose affairs the federal government should 
not meddle.  
III. MARKET-BASED ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 
A. Competition for Taxpayers 
Traditional laissez-faire theorists believe that robust private-sector 
competition allocates resources to their highest value use and 
efficiently and correctly prices goods and services. From this 
perspective, the problem with private-sector bailouts is that they 
interfere with valuable free-market functions. By analogy, federal 
bailouts of subnational governments also interfere with markets. 
“Competitive federalism” notions, for example, imagine markets in 
which relatively autonomous state and local governments freely 
compete by offering specific tax and public service “packages” to 
target constituencies, thereby facilitating the most efficient allocation 
 
 145. See supra notes 121–27. 
 146. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND OPERATING DATA 
REPORT 58–60 (Dec. 18, 2016), http://bgfpr.com/documents/CommonwealthofPuertoRico 
FinancialInfoFY201612-18-16.pdf (discussing importance of federal transfers to Puerto Rican 
economy).  
 147. P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (“The appropriations made for any fiscal year shall not 
exceed the total revenues, including available surplus, estimated for said fiscal Year unless the 
imposition of taxes sufficient to cover said appropriations is provided by law.”).  
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of public resources.
148
 At first blush, this “competition for taxpayers” 
model suggests support for a presumption against higher-level 
government aid to struggling subnational governments because such 
assistance might interfere with free-market advantages that 
competitive federalism otherwise offers to subnational governments.  
Indeed, federal tax advantages already available to Puerto Rico in 
the competition for taxpayers suggest perhaps that the presumption 
against any further federal intervention should be even stronger than 
it is for the states. Specifically, U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico 
are exempt from federal income tax on their Puerto Rico-sourced 
income, other than income from services as a U.S. government 
employee.
149
 Businesses located in Puerto Rico also are eligible for 
Puerto Rican and U.S. tax breaks, which offer incentives to locate 
business operations in Puerto Rico.
150
 Whatever the apparent tax 
advantages, however, economic realities belie the notion that Puerto 
Rico is a stronger competitor than the states in the market for 
taxpayers.
151
 
In any event, the free-market analogy between private and public 
markets used to support the “competition for taxpayer” model is 
imperfect to begin with. First, one valuable function of traditional 
free markets is that they eliminate poorly managed or inefficient 
firms. Whereas bankruptcy fears presumably check private firm 
inefficiency and misbehavior, state governments do not experience 
the disciplinary impact of potential bankruptcy. Second, competition 
for taxpayer models necessarily assume mobility, i.e., that taxpayers 
can easily relocate in response to competing public service packages. 
 
 148. The logic underlying “competitive federalism” is usually attributed to Charles 
Tiebout’s, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  
 149. 26 U.S.C. § 933 (2012). As U.S. citizens, however, Puerto Ricans must pay federal 
income tax on worldwide income from sources other than Puerto Rico. TAX LAWS RELATED TO 
TERRITORIES, supra note 128, at 9. In addition, all Puerto Rican workers and their employers 
must pay their shares of federal employment taxes. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121(e); 3306(j) (2012). These 
so-called “employment taxes” include both the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) tax 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012)) to provide funding for social security, 
Medicare, and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 3301–3311 (2012)) to provide funding for federal unemployment insurance. 
 150. See infra notes 192–209, and accompanying text. 
 151. See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text on Puerto Rico’s dramatic 
outmigration. 
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The models also assume that taxpayers opt to “reside” in jurisdictions 
that most closely match their public service preferences.
152
 Unlike 
economically-driven consumer behavior, however, individual 
decisions about where to live are often based on personal factors such 
as cultural and family ties rather than tax cost and public goods and 
services preferences. Also, while the mobility assumption may be 
somewhat stronger for business taxpayers, firm location decisions 
similarly are not driven entirely by tax cost and public service 
preferences, but also by other factors, such as proximity to necessary 
natural resources and labor markets. Another conceptual problem 
with the mobility assumption is that—with the exception of some 
regional economies—taxpayers arguably are more likely to move to 
another city or town within the same state than to move to another 
state. In other words, the assumption of taxpayer mobility seems less 
viable regarding the choice of state—as opposed to municipal—
residence.
153
 Thus, the “competitive federalism” theory offers modest 
support for presumptions against local government bailouts, but 
weaker support as applied to the states and Puerto Rico.  
B. Competition for Debt 
State governments compete for borrowing as well as for 
taxpayers. By analogy to private lending markets, government bond 
markets presumably consider borrowers’ risk profiles in pricing 
municipal bonds. In theory, the threat of high-risk premiums should 
incentivize officials to be fiscally prudent and similarly incentivize 
creditors to carefully monitor government activities that might 
decrease the value of their investments. Thus, one powerful argument 
for a presumption against federal rescue interventions in the states 
and Puerto Rico is the need to preserve fiscal prudence incentives for 
subnational government officials. Ironically, however, the federal 
 
 152. Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Personal (and 
Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2008). See generally Todd E. 
Petts, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481 (2004). 
 153. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 118, at 82 (noting that “subunits [states] that 
possess rights under a federal system are generally too large to generate the necessary range of 
choices”); id. (further noting that the article upon which the competitive federalism theory was 
based actually studied location choices within one metropolitan area’s suburbs). 
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government already interferes in municipal bond markets, not by 
providing direct financial assistance, but with tax incentives that 
encourage subnational government borrowing in the first place.
154
 
This irony is even more profound with respect to Puerto Rico, where 
public debt is eligible for “triple exemption.”155 
C. Moral Hazard and Precedent-Setting 
“Moral hazard” is a related, economically-based principle, which 
provides perhaps the strongest support for underlying presumptions 
against both private and public sector bailouts. Despite its origins as 
an insurance and then as a broader economic principle,
156
 moral 
hazard has broader intuitive appeal as an evocative, short-hand label 
to describe perverse incentives for people to behave more recklessly 
when they believe they will be not be fully accountable for the 
negative consequences of their actions. As applied to subnational 
government bailouts, the concern is that federal assistance 
expectations may make voters and public officials less inclined to 
suffer painful fiscal adjustments, and also may encourage lax 
budgetary oversight or greater financial risk-taking. Even the 
perception that government assistance might be available can not 
only increase the risk of poor fiscal decision-making, but also may 
leave unscrupulous politicians more comfortable with fiscally 
irresponsible or even corrupt behavior. Political economy approaches 
to federalism emphasize something similar to moral hazard, noting 
that central governments in multi-tiered regimes almost always face 
the possibility that lower-tier governments “will try to over-fish the 
common revenue pool . . . .”157 The result of such “safety net” 
expectations is that subnational governments are ultimately subject 
only to “soft” budget constraints, i.e., they are not truly forced to live 
 
 154. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (federal income tax exemption for municipal bond 
interest). See also infra notes 186–88, and accompanying text. 
 155. See infra notes 189–91, and accompanying text. 
 156. David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term ‘Moral Hazard,’ 79 J. RISK 
INS. 1051 (2012).  
 157. Jonathan Rodden, The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal 
Performance Around the World, 46 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 670, 671 (2002). See also Clayton P. 
Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 281, 300 (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 53:215 
 
 
within their means. The central government’s policy challenge is to 
avoid setting expectation-creating precedent while nonetheless 
providing appropriate assistance in cases of genuine crisis.
158
 As 
Martin Feldstein said when he reacted to International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) assistance extended during the Southeast Asian currency 
collapse in the late 1990s, “[t]here is no perfect solution to [the] 
‘moral hazard’ problem;”159 he then added that, “[i]n principle, the 
IMF and the Korean government should provide the guarantees 
needed to keep current creditors engaged while swearing that it is the 
last time that such guarantees will be provided.”160 Though I hesitate 
to be so glib in an academic article, I cannot resist responding: good 
luck with that!  
As in the state context, concerns that any federal intervention will 
create expectations for future rescue assistance provide the most 
powerful support for a presumption against federal bailout assistance 
to Puerto Rico.
161
 Nonetheless, I believe that Puerto Rico’s status and 
circumstances, once properly framed, are unique enough to allay 
most congressional fears that federal assistance would set unwanted 
precedent or create expectations in financially troubled states such as 
Illinois. 
IV. EQUITY, FAIRNESS, AND PRESUMPTOINS AGAINST SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS  
There simply is no easy answer to the equity question raised by 
most bailouts—they are unfair in the sense that most of us think of 
fairness. This in itself, is another reason to at least begin with a 
 
 158. One arguable way for central government to quell bailout expectations is to adopt a 
policy of “constructive ambiguity.” See, e.g., Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New 
Framework to Regulate "Too Big to Fail" Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
829, 842–45 (2010); James B. Thomson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and 
Progressive Systemic Migration, Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 27, 
8–9 (Aug. 2009). The first difficulty with this approach is that governments may not be in a 
position to fail to act in cases of genuine crisis. Moreover, participation in even one financial 
rescue creates expectations that others may follow. 
 159. Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 20, 30 (1998). 
 160. Id. (emphasis added). 
 161. A less rigid presumption should arguably apply, however, in cases of subnational 
government economic crisis triggered by isolated, exogenous events over which officials and 
residents have little control. 
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presumption against them. In financial rescues, those receiving direct 
“bailout” benefits generally are not chosen because they are more 
deserving, and government assistance is not based upon equity 
considerations. In economic terms, those who benefit directly from 
government bailout protection are simply the fortunate recipients of 
positive spillover effects. More troubling, perhaps, is the notion of 
direct benefits going to those who are positively undeserving—or 
worse—of incidental benefits going to those who engaged in outright 
fraud or massive speculation, or to those who are substantially 
responsible for creating the economic crisis in the first place. An 
important related factor that should not be underestimated is political 
morale. Those who experience economic hardship without any 
federal rescue intervention understandably bear resentments when 
government attention and resources are targeted to assisting others.  
I firmly believe that public policy should begin with a strong 
presumption against subnational government bailouts, and that the 
autonomy, integrity, and independence of these governments are 
important underlying considerations in support of such a 
presumption. In a genuine federalist regime, central government 
should not lightly interfere in the affairs of lower-level governments. 
Ultimately, however, the strongest case for a presumption against 
subnational government bailouts is not sovereignty-related, but a 
concern for the equitable allocation of scarce societal resources, 
public morale, and the danger of creating expectations that will 
encourage subnational government fiscal blindness or 
irresponsibility. Yet, rigid rules to preempt even the possibility of 
government assistance are short-sighted and ignore the reality that 
some future emergencies will undoubtedly lead to bailout-type 
intervention in any event. In the long run, undue resistance to early 
intervention can result in substantially higher public costs as 
economic distress conditions worsen and government intervention 
becomes increasingly inevitable.  
With respect to Puerto Rico, I contend that the federal government 
has greater responsibility than it does to the states, which have deeply 
entrenched self-governance rights that cannot be altered simply by 
statute. Many have written of—and the Supreme Court has recently 
confirmed—the numerous ways in which Puerto Rico is effectively 
still treated as a colony. Focusing particularly on tax policy, for 
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example, Professor Diane Lourdes chronicles what she refers to as 
the U.S. government’s “tax imperialism” toward Puerto Rico and 
claims that “the United States has used tax laws to advance its own 
economic and political interests at the expense of its island 
territory.”162 As such, the United States should take some 
responsibility to help Puerto Rico in moments of extreme crisis. By 
agreeing with these claims, I am not arguing that Congress should be 
loose in deciding to intervene, nor am I suggesting that Congress 
needs to appropriate substantial federal revenue. Even in the case of 
Puerto Rico, where I believe Congress has a much greater obligation 
than for the states, federal interventions are appropriate only in rare 
and extraordinary circumstances, and responses should be tailored to 
particular circumstances. The section that follows assesses grounds 
and evidence relevant to decisions to overcome initial anti-
intervention presumptions. 
V. OVERCOMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR ANTI-BAILOUT PRESUMPTION: 
U.S. STATES AND PUERTO RICO COMPARED 
A. Systemic Risk: Too Big, Too Interconnected, or Too Important to 
Fail 
Once confronted with evidence that federal government inaction 
would lead to immediate economic Armageddon, it is hard to 
imagine that Congress would do nothing. In other words, the most 
straight-forward rebuttal argument to presumptions against bailouts is 
risk of imminent systemic economic harm. Some have already 
suggested that California is “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF), and that its 
economic collapse could dramatically interfere with the economies of 
neighboring states, regions, the country, or even the world.
163
  
In assessing potential system-wide harms, the size of a struggling 
state or territory’s economy is undeniably relevant, but nonetheless 
 
 162. Diane Lourdes Dick, U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 85 
(2015). 
 163. cording to recent reports, “California passed Brazil and France to become the world’s 
6th-largest economy in 2015 . . .” California Jumps to the World’s 6th Largest Economy; Leads 
All States in Growth in 2015, Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy (July 
2016), http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-July-2016-CA-Economy-Rankings-2015.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments 249 
 
 
may be less important than other factors such as economic 
interconnectedness. The Greek economy, for example, is small 
relative to other European Union (EU) countries,
164
 yet its collapse 
could have serious political and economic consequences for the 
EU.
165
 The United States and Puerto Rican economies are sufficiently 
intertwined that serious problems in the United States would have a 
devastating impact upon Puerto Rico. On the other hand, while 
financial crisis in Puerto Rico might create disruptions in certain U.S. 
markets,
166
 it is much less likely to have a dramatic impact on the 
overall U.S. economy. 
Even so, a Puerto Rican financial crisis theoretically could have 
serious spillover effects with implications for overall U.S. economic 
stability. Just as private “banks runs” can result from rational or 
irrational market fears that problems at one bank might spread to 
another, word of economic difficulty or a bond rating downgrade for 
one state could trigger substantial economic harm to municipal bond 
markets elsewhere. One potentially serious concern in Puerto Rico’s 
case is that triple tax exemption and higher bond yields make the 
island’s public debt even more attractive than many other municipal 
debt issues.
167
 For example, the Wall Street Journal in 2013 reported 
that, “[f]or decades, Puerto Rico was a bedrock investment in many 
municipal-bond portfolios, its bonds owned directly or through 
 
 164. Economic Crisis: The Global Impact of a Greek Default: Hearings Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Subcomm. on Nat’l Security and Int’l 
Trade and Finance 33, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Sr. Fellow, 
Peterson Institute for Int’l Econ.) (“Greece is a small country, accounting for only 1.8 percent 
of total euro area GDP, and hence does not pose a material risk to overall euro area financial 
stability.”). See also id. at 36 (concluding that “Greek default does not pose systemic risks to 
either the euro area or the global economy”); id. at 31 (testimony of Carmen M. Reinhart, Prof., 
Harvard Kennedy School of Gov’t) (noting limited contagion risk from Greek crisis via 
financial channels).  
 165. The Greek financial crisis has “taken the EU and Eurozone into unchartered territory . 
. . [and] significantly heightened political tensions and public dissatisfaction with the EU.” 
REBECCA M. NELSON, PAUL BELKIN, & JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44155, 
THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 10 (2015). 
Some believe that the crisis could lead to Greece’s exit from the Eurozone, “which could 
seriously undermine the integrity of the Eurozone and even the EU itself.” Id. 
 166. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 19–20 (possible 
impact of Puerto Rican financial crisis on Florida). 
 167. See supra note 155 and infra notes 189–91, and accompanying text. 
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mutual funds.”168 Another report in 2015 observed that “many of 
Puerto Rico's bonds have ended up in the hands of Main Street 
investors on the United States mainland, people who invested in 
mutual funds without checking to see what was in the funds’ 
portfolios.”169 Some understandably were worried about potential 
contagion effects spreading from Puerto Rico to U.S. bond markets 
more generally.  
Had the contagion dangers been more clear and imminent, 
Congress might have cited systemic risk to justify overcoming the 
general presumption against federal intervention. Though many 
mused about potential contagion from growing Puerto Rican public 
debt problems, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 
which is charged with responsibility for monitoring and identifying 
risks to U.S. financial stability,
170
 was not immediately concerned, 
reporting both in 2015 and 2016 that, “[d]espite problems exhibited 
by Puerto Rico, there has been little spillover thus far to the broader 
municipal bond market.”171 Although the FSOC’s 2015 report 
cautioned that, “continued deterioration in the economic and financial 
conditions in Puerto Rico . . . could impact the municipal debt 
market,”172 its 2016 report included no such caveat. In other words, 
the FSOC was even less concerned with possible contagion from 
Puerto Rico to general bond markets in 2016 than it had been in 
2015. Thus, even assuming that Puerto Rico’s financial disaster 
justified federal rescue intervention for other policy reasons, its dire 
economic circumstances in 2015 and 2016 were not sufficient to 
rebut the presumption against subnational government bailouts on 
systemic-risk grounds. 
 
 168. Mike Cherney, Puerto Rico Debt Woes Grow—U.S. Regulators Concerned About 
Effects of Bond Declines on Investors, Market, WALL STREET J., Oct. 7, 2013, at C1 (reporting 
that “about three-fourths of all municipal-bond mutual funds own debt issued by Puerto 
Rico . . .”). 
 169. Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Fails to Pay $58 Million Bond Debt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2015, at B1. 
 170. he FSOC was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a) 
(establishing FSOC); id. at § 5322(a)(1) (FSOC’s purpose to identify financial stability risks, 
promote market discipline, and respond to emerging financial stability threats). 
 171. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (FSOC), ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2015); 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (FSOC), ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2016). 
 172. FSOC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 29. 
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Under circumstances of financial distress that present no obvious 
imminent threat, a related plausible rebuttal argument is that the 
federal government’s failure to act will result in future systemic harm 
at potentially higher costs than those that would result from early 
“preemptive” intervention. The reality, of course, is that genuinely 
imminent threats are rare, and the risks that inaction today will have 
devastating consequences tomorrow can be so difficult to measure. 
The real challenge for policymakers is considering subnational 
governments’ appeals for assistance absent evidence of such extreme 
circumstances. 
B. Creating “Public Goods”—or Avoiding “Public Bads” 
Another related rebuttal argument is that rescue interventions 
provide a public “good” even for those not receiving direct financial 
support. For example, the financial stability benefits generated by 
central government actions to forestall imminent system-wide harm 
are presumably valuable to all stakeholders in the economic system. 
Argued from the flip side, the failure to prevent avoidable systemic 
harm creates a “public bad.” Described as such, these arguments do 
little more than reiterate the systemic-risk rebuttal case, albeit dressed 
in different clothes. Given that recent events in Puerto Rico did not 
pose threats of systemic harm or contagion to general bond markets, 
the case for federal assistance cannot be based on systemic risk or 
related public good/public bad arguments.  
Still, preserving fundamental economic stability is not the only 
conceivable public good that might result from central government 
assistance to a struggling subnational government. Though national 
public officials may have a difficult time persuading constituents that 
they should share any of the burden associated with assistance 
directly targeted to benefit others, central government assistance to 
one struggling subnational government sometimes provides benefits 
to citizens elsewhere. If the struggling state or territory provides 
widely-used critical energy or other resources, for example, the 
public good might be preserving an otherwise disrupted supply or 
distribution of resources. Another example might be assistance to a 
subnational government whose economy is dominated by goods 
manufactured for nationwide export. In this instance, the public good 
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generated might be protecting consumers against significant price 
increases, or preserving jobs in industries that might otherwise suffer 
collateral hardship from business failures in the distressed 
government’s economy.  
One unique argument that might appeal to the shared interests of 
those not receiving direct benefits from central government assistance 
to Puerto Rico involves the statutory U.S. citizenship of Puerto Rican 
residents. More specifically, because they obtain U.S. citizenship at 
birth, Puerto Ricans are free to migrate to the United States without 
special permission or visas.
173
 Upon establishing residence in a U.S. 
state, such statutory citizens become full constitutional citizens 
entitled to benefits, privileges, and protections available under the 
U.S. Constitution.
174
 At least for some Puerto Ricans, one incentive 
for relocating may be access to better federal government health 
benefits. For example, individual Puerto Rican citizens are not 
eligible to participate in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
program; they are covered instead by an alternative program that 
typically pays lower benefits.
175
 Indeed, reporting on federal health 
care funding debates, the Congressional Task Force on Puerto Rico 
recently noted the argument of some that “it is not appropriate to 
exclude U.S. citizens living in the territories from the SSI program, 
especially considering that residents of the territories can simply 
relocate to the states and obtain full SSI benefits.”176 
 
 173. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection website advises, for example, that “U.S. 
Citizens . . . who travel directly between parts of the United States, which includes . . . Puerto 
Rico . . ., without touching a foreign port or place are not required to present a valid U.S. 
Passport . . . .” Needing a Passport to Enter the United States from United States Territories, 
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/980/~/ 
needing-a-passport-to-enter-the-united-states-from-u.s.-territories (last updated Feb. 24, 2017, 
4:04 PM). 
 174. See Lawson & Sloane, supra note 136, at 1161 (noting “the bizarre state of affairs, 
which persists today, that resident aliens physically located with a state of the United States 
may enjoy greater benefits and rights under federal law than Puerto Rican citizens of the United 
States. Yet, those same citizens, simply by exercising their right to relocate to one of the states, 
can acquire ‘every right of any other citizen of the United States, civil, social, and political.’”). 
The reverse is also true; a constitutional U.S. citizen who relocates to Puerto Rico becomes a 
statutory citizen, thereby losing rights to vote in presidential elections and certain other benefits. 
See, e.g., California v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–306 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e) 
(2012). See also CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 19. 
 176. Id. at 54. 
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In addition to individual citizens’ ineligibility for SSI, the Puerto 
Rican government’s Medicaid program also suffers from what many 
argue is “historically inadequate” federal funding. As one policy 
analyst describes, for example, “[u]nlike the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia, Puerto Rico is limited to a low, fixed amount of federal 
Medicaid funding each year irrespective of its actual Medicaid 
costs.”177 Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories subject to this cap 
usually exhaust available federal funds before the end of their fiscal 
years, thereafter assuming the full cost of additional, yet mandated, 
Medicaid costs.
178
 The result is that Puerto Rican residents do not 
receive all of the Medicaid benefits to which they are entitled.
179
 
Congress provided a temporary remedy by including a one-time 
increase to Puerto Rico’s Medicaid funding in the 2010 Affordable 
Care Act,
180
 but this supplemental funding is likely to be “depleted 
before the end of calendar year 2017, a date that has come to be 
known as the “Medicaid cliff.”181 
Concerned about the potentially disastrous impact of the cliff, the 
Obama Administration argued to Congress in 2015 that: 
There are more than 1.6 million Medicaid enrollees in Puerto 
Rico’s healthcare system, of which 600,000 people living in 
Puerto Rico could lose the healthcare coverage when one-time 
Medicaid funds run out. Congress should reform Puerto Rico’s 
Medicaid program to increase access to coverage, raise the 
 
 177. See, e.g., MEDICAID FUNDING SHORTFALLS, supra note 112. See also 42 U.S.C. § 
1308(a), (f), (g)(5) (2012) (Medicaid caps on U.S. territories).   
 178. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-75, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: MULTIPLE 
FACTORS AFFECT FEDERAL HEALTH CARE FUNDING 19-20 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, INSULAR 
AREAS REPORT]. See also infra note 226, and accompanying text. 
 179. The GAO reports that “[d]ue to insufficient local funds, . . . some insular areas may 
suspend services or cease payments to providers until the next fiscal year.” Id. Remarkably, the 
Congressional Research Service also reports that, “[i]n light of these statutory limits, CMS 
[referring to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which oversees many federal 
health care programs] does not hold insular areas accountable for providing all the mandatory 
Medicaid services, including nursing home care, which makes up nearly one-third of Medicaid 
expenditures in the states.” Id.  
 180. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, § 2005(c), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 284 (2010) (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2012)). See 
also infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 181. CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 19. 
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standard of care and prevent Medicaid’s unstable financing 
from worsening Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis.182 
Dire economic circumstances in Puerto Rico over the past decade 
have already led to dramatic outmigration.
183
 Whether driven 
explicitly by the promise of better federal health care benefits in the 
United States, or more generally by the need to escape deteriorating 
economic conditions in Puerto Rico, further outmigration and the 
resulting influx of automatic U.S. citizens could substantially burden 
social service, healthcare, education, and other federal and state 
budgets. Additional costs for these programs and benefits, which 
presumably would be borne by general taxpayers, might ultimately be 
higher than the costs of early intervention measures that might have 
assisted in stopping or slowing Puerto Rico’s downward economic 
spiral. Effectively making this “avoidance of public bad” argument, 
for example, the 2016 Congressional Task Force acknowledged that 
resisting increased Medicaid funding to Puerto Rico might save 
federal taxpayer dollars in the short-run, but nonetheless 
recommended increased Medicaid support for Puerto Rico not only to 
eliminate funding inequities, but also “to reduce the incentive for 
migration from the territories to the states and the associated financial 
costs to state governments and the federal government . . . .”184  
Finally, another possible “public good” argument for rebutting the 
presumption against intervention might be based on protecting a 
militarily strategic location. In other words, it may be in our 
collective interests to prevent any destabilization in Puerto Rico that 
might raise military or security concerns. A somewhat related Puerto-
Rico specific argument builds on the premise that Puerto Rico plays a 
significant role in trafficking operations through which illegal drugs 
 
 182. ROADMAP FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, supra note 19, at 3. 
 183. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
 184. CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 20. Given the U.S. 
citizenship of Puerto Ricans by birth, outmigration from Puerto Rico to the United States 
technically is not an immigration issue. Nonetheless, I am mindful of the ongoing—and 
politically loaded—debate over immigration restrictions. To my mind, general anti-immigration 
sentiments driven by concerns about increased government costs that newcomers might impose 
are not only misplaced, but also fail to account for the many benefits and values that immigrants 
bring to the United States. Thanks to Elizabeth Sepper for reminding me of the political 
sensitivities surrounding these cost issues.   
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reach the United States, and that these operations potentially threaten 
U.S. security. For these reasons, a 2014 report for the Center for 
Strategic & International Studies argues that continued economic 
decline in Puerto Rico should be “a concern not only for Puerto Rico 
but also for the United States as a whole.”185 If the underlying 
premise is correct—though I’m not at all certain that it is—the 
argument would belong among those that might be considered in 
rebutting the initial presumption against federal rescue assistance for 
Puerto Rico. 
C. Equitable, Structural, or Morally-Based Rebuttals 
1. Federal Government as “Co-Investor,” “Co-Dependent” or 
Culpable Partner 
One potential rebuttal to the initial presumption against federal 
interventions to assist subnational governments is the federal 
government’s participation in—and at least arguable contribution 
to—the latter’s economic difficulties. Federal and subnational 
governments today share funding, administrative, and policymaking 
responsibilities for a wide array of programs through many different, 
often complex, structural arrangements. To the extent that a state 
government’s fiscal problems are dominated by costs associated with 
such programs, one might argue that the federal government’s 
interest as partner or “co-investor” comes with some obligation to 
assist subnational governments with fiscal emergencies. Moreover, 
the central government is not completely free of culpability for 
subnational governments’ excessive debt, given that it encourages 
the very behavior that leads subnational governments into debt 
troubles in the first place. In fact, the federal tax exemption for 
interest on state and local bonds effectively provides a subsidy with 
no upper limit for state and local borrowing.
186
 By providing such tax 
exemptions, the federal government arguably supports bad state 
habits, in a sense acting as “co-dependent.” Federal tax laws also 
 
 185. JOSÉ J. VILLAMIL & CARL MEACHAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES REPORT, WHY PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMY MATTERS FOR U.S. SECURITY 10 (2014). 
 186. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). See also supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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include deductions for state and local tax,
187
 which reduce residents’ 
after-tax burdens, thereby enabling higher second and third-tier 
government spending at lower taxpayer cost. These effective federal 
subsidies may encourage subnational governments to over borrow 
and to support larger and less prudent spending programs than they 
would in the absence of federal exemptions and deductions. This is 
not to suggest complete repeal of the municipal bond interest 
exemption or the state and local tax deduction,
188
 which may support 
other policy valid objectives. My point is that the federal government 
is not an innocent bystander; it plays a role in determining the extent 
of state and local government debt. 
The case for at least partial federal responsibility for excessive 
subnational debt is even stronger as applied to Puerto Rico. Unlike 
U.S. state and local bonds, which are exempt only from federal—and, 
in some cases, from some state—income taxes on interest, Puerto 
Rican public debt is an especially attractive investment because it is 
free from federal, state, and Puerto Rican income taxes—a triple tax 
exemption.
189
 At least theoretically, the exemption provides Puerto 
Rico with financial benefits, particularly by easing access to capital 
markets. While the exemption’s early legislative history offers some 
evidence of congressional intent to aid the island’s economic 
development and to provide humanitarian benefits,
190
 the triple tax 
exemption, along with other bond features designed to protect 
 
 187. 26 U.S.C. § 164 (2012). 
 188. It might be appropriate, though, to cap amounts eligible for the municipal bond 
interest exemption, or impose some limits on state and local tax deductions. 
 189. The relevant statute provides that:  
All bonds issued by the Government of Puerto Rico, or by its authority, shall be 
exempt from taxation by the Government of the United States, or by the Government 
of Puerto Rico, or of any political or municipal subdivision thereof, or by any State, 
Territory, or possession, or by any county, municipality, or other municipal 
subdivision of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or by the 
District of Columbia. 
48 U.S.C. § 745 (2012). 
 190. See Dick, supra note 162 at 47–48 (referring to legislative history from 1917). On the 
other hand, Professor Dick is skeptical, arguing that a more likely explanation may be “the 
nearly insatiable U.S. demand for municipal bonds at a time when supply was less than 
normal[,]” and further suggesting that Congress “capitalized on the island’s plight by expanding 
the municipal bond supply for U.S. investors.” Id. at 48. 
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creditors, may have made Puerto Rican public debt too attractive and 
too easy to market.
191
  
In addition to the longstanding tax exemption for Puerto Rican 
bonds, the United States also has a long history of tax incentives to 
encourage investment in its possessions and territories.
192
 In the 
1940s, Puerto Rico began “Operation Bootstrap,” to supplement the 
U.S. “possessions exemption,”193 with its own generous tax and 
economic incentives to encourage American businesses to invest in 
Puerto Rico.
194
 In 1976, Congress replaced its “possessions 
exemption” with a new § 936 “tax sparing” rule.195 To fully 
appreciate this provision’s generosity, keep in mind that the standard 
rationale for foreign tax credits is eliminating the double tax burden 
that results when U.S. taxpayers engaged in business operations 
abroad are taxed both by the foreign country or possession and the 
United States.
196
 Tax credits available to such taxpayers are designed 
to offset U.S. tax liability by the taxes already paid to a foreign 
country or possession on the same activity. In contrast, the § 936 “tax 
sparing” incentive,197 designed specifically to encourage economic 
 
 191. Puerto Rico added further enticements to make its debt attractive to investors by 
including various “backstops, lockboxes and guarantee mechanisms . . . , identifying specific 
revenue streams and promising them to certain groups of bondholders.” Walsh, The Bonds That 
Broke Puerto Rico, supra note 24. “In 2006, for example, the Puerto Rico government created 
an independent debt-issuing authority called Cofina, which had first claim to a fixed portion of 
all sales taxes on the island, to offer as collateral for bonds.” Id. 
 192. Federal income tax exemptions for certain income from sources within U.S. 
possessions began in 1921. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 262, 42 Stat. 227, 271 (1921) 
(eligibility required that taxpayer’s gross income over a three-year period be 80% or more from 
sources within the possession, and—in the case of corporations—that 50% or more be from 
active conduct of a trade or business within the possession). 
 193. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 931(a), (c), 68A Stat. 3, 291 
(repealed 1996).  
 194. Industrial Tax Exemption Act, Act of May 13, 1948, P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 221–38. See 
also Ann J. Davidson, A Credit for All Reasons: The Ambivalent Role of Section 936, 19 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 97, 107–115 (1987) (describing phases and impact of “Operation 
Bootstrap”). 
 195. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1520, 1643–44 (adding 
new 26 U.S.C. § 936) (repealed 1996). For a general description of § 936 and its rationale, see 
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, JCS-33-
76, 272–78 (1976) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION]. See also Davidson, supra note 194, at 
115–17; Dick, supra note 162, at 68–72.  
 196. 26 U.S.C. § § 901, 904 (2012).  
 197. The U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) reported that 98% of benefits from § 
936 went to companies operating in Puerto Rico. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 53:215 
 
 
and job growth in Puerto Rico,
198
 generously extended the credit even 
when the taxpayer incurred no Puerto Rican tax on its Puerto Rican 
operations.
199
  
The § 936 credit offered particular advantages to U.S. 
manufacturers, especially pharmaceutical companies,
200
 which took 
advantage of deducting high, up-front drug development expenses on 
their U.S. tax returns, even though they manufactured the drugs in 
Puerto Rico. The combination of U.S. tax credits and generous Puerto 
Rican tax exemptions effectively eliminated all corporate tax liability 
on drug sale profits.
201
 Ultimately disappointed that § 936 failed to 
generate sufficient Puerto Rican job growth to justify the U.S. cost in 
revenue foregone,
202
 Congress repealed the credit in 1996.
203
 
Concerned about the potentially harmful economic impact of an 
immediate total repeal, however, Congress simultaneously added a 
new, slightly more restrictive credit, which was phased out between 
1996 and 2006.
204
 
A GAO report on the impact of § 936’s repeal found that the 
Puerto Rican manufacturing sector overall suffered greater 
 
06-541, PUERTO RICO: FISCAL RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC 
TRENDS SURING THE PHASEOUT OF THE POSSESSIONS TAX CREDIT 2 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, 
FISCAL RELATIONS].  
 198. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 195, at 272.  
 199. See, e.g., LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, A Framework for Evaluating the Legislative 
Viability of Proposals to Provide Foreign Direct Investment Incentives Through the Internal 
Revenue Code, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 315, 323 (2003) (describing the possessions credit 
as “‘tax sparing’” because it is granted without regard to whether the electing corporation pays 
income tax to the possession”).  
 200. See generally U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-72BR, 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: TAX BENEFITS OF OPERATING IN PUERTO RICO CREDIT (1992). 
See also Andrew E. Gerow, Shooting for the Stars (and Stripes): How Decades of Failed 
Corporate Tax Policy Contributed to Puerto Rico’s Historic Vote in Favor of Statehood, 88 
TUL. L. REV. 627, 642 (2014). 
 201. See Dick, supra note 162, at 62 (describing United States and Puerto Rican incentives 
together as “amount[ing] to a total holiday from virtually all forms of taxation”).  
 202. U.S. COMM. ON FINANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1994 BUDGET RECONCILIATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 103d Cong. 148 (Comm. Print 1993) 
(recognizing importance of § 936 credit to Puerto Rico, while noting studies indicating “that a 
disproportionate share of the tax benefits attributable to section 936 is realized by certain 
industries that create relatively few jobs in the possessions”). 
 203. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1601(a), 110 Stat. 
1755, 1827–30 (repealing § 936).  
 204. Id. at § 1601(b), 110 Stat., at 1831–33 (Section 30A “Puerto Rican Economic Activity 
Tax Credit,” to expire at the end of 2005). 
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percentage declines than those experienced on the U.S. mainland, but 
that economic declines in the chemical industry were “largely offset 
by the increased activity of other members of the same corporate 
groups . . . .”205 In other words, the pharmaceutical industry—the 
primary beneficiary of § 936 tax incentives—did not suffer 
dramatically when the credit was repealed.
206
  
 On the other hand, the New York Federal Reserve saw the 
repeal’s impact somewhat differently, noting first that § 936 
incentives had artificially concentrated resources in Puerto Rican-
manufactured pharmaceuticals for export to the U.S. mainland. The 
Federal Reserve observed that the pharmaceutical industry has not 
only lost an artificial economic boost, previously provided by § 936 
tax credits, but has also suffered from increased economic pressures 
from other sources. As such, the report concluded that “there appears 
little prospect of regaining a significant share of the jobs that have 
been lost.”207  
To be sure, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
American tax policy contributed to Puerto Rico’s economic growth 
after the credit was introduced, or to the island’s economic declines 
as Congress increasingly restricted the credit, finally ending it as of 
2006. Though surely not the only factor, the § 936 tax credit phase-
out is prominent among explanations cited for Puerto Rico’s 
declining manufacturing sector and reduced employment.
208
 The 
Krueger Report also notes that “[b]ecause negative growth coincided 
with the final phase-out of IRS Section 936 provisions . . . , it is 
customary to cite the loss of tax preferences as the original sin behind 
Puerto Rico’s travails. The loss undoubtedly hollowed out the 
manufacturing base but was hardly the only blow.”209  
 
 205. GAO, FISCAL RELATIONS, supra note 197, at 11. 
 206. Id. In part, many pharmaceutical corporations survived the repeal of § 936 by 
changing their status “to controlled foreign corporations, or CFCs, and this status has enabled 
them to continue to receive some federal tax advantages while located on the Island.” FED. RES. 
REPORT, supra note 50, at 16. 
 207. Id. at 16. As further evidence of the §936 repeal on Puerto Rico’s monetary reserves, 
the Federal Reserve reported that “[t]he rollback of [§936] tax incentives, . . . , prompted a shift 
to brokered deposits. In recent years, regulators have taken steps to curtail the banks’ reliance 
on brokered deposits . . . introducing renewed constraints on bank lending capacity.” Id., at 15. 
 208. Id. 
 209. KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4. 
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2. Unique Federal Government Restrictions on Puerto Rico 
A related argument for at least partial federal responsibility for 
Puerto Rico’s economic crisis stems not from the former’s role as 
partner or “co-dependent,” but from U.S. government policies that 
actively interfere with Puerto Rico’s ability to compete freely in the 
global markets. Given Puerto Rico’s dependence on shipping, for 
example, maritime laws are critically important to its economy. 
Though Congress placed harbor areas and navigable waters under 
Puerto Rico’s control in 1917,210 a federal law in place since 1920 
requires Puerto Rico—for purposes of transporting merchandise 
between U.S. and Puerto Rican ports—to use only vessels built and 
registered in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens, and that hire 
primarily U.S. citizen crews.
211
 This mandate results in crewing costs 
averaging five times more than foreign flag carriers,
212
 and limits 
Puerto Rico’s options to a small number of carriers.213 This limited 
supply and high demand for a small number of ships puts upward 
pressure on freight rates, thereby further increasing Puerto Rico’s 
already extremely high shipping costs.
214
 In addition, virtually all 
authorized carriers—as reported in 2013—were using containerships 
and barges well beyond their average expected useful lives, which 
caused them to burn more fuel, operate at lower speeds, and to 
require greater repair and maintenance expenses.
215
 Though opinions 
differ on the extent to which Jones Act-mandated shipping costs 
contributed to Puerto Rico’s financial decline and crisis, “most agree 
that the net effect is negative—largely because the act boosts the cost 
of imported goods to Island residents but also because it makes 
 
 210. Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, at § 8, 39 Stat. 951, 954 (1917) (now codified as part 
of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. § 749).  
 211. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 27, 41 Stat. 988, 999 (1920) 
(codified at 46 U.S.C. §883). Though distinct from 1917 legislation, supra note 210, sometimes 
referred to as the “Jones Act,” the 1920 Merchant Marine Act is also frequently known as the 
“Jones Act”).  
 212. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-260, PUERTO RICO: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISLAND’S MARITIME TRADE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF 
MODIFYING THE JONES ACT 15 (2013). 
 213. Writing in 2013, for example, the GAO reported only four available “Jones Act” 
carriers. Id. at 6.  
 214. Id. at 14.  
 215. Id. at 6, 15. 
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exports less competitive and diminishes the viability of the Island as 
a major regional transshipment port.”216 
3. Puerto Rico’s Differential Treatment Under Federal Subsidy 
Programs 
Another possible rebuttal to the presumption against federal 
government assistance intervention in Puerto Rico focuses on Puerto 
Rico’s unequal treatment under certain federal programs. Like the 
U.S. states, Puerto Rico participates in numerous federal programs 
and relies heavily on federal transfer payments.
217
 For many of these 
programs, Congress treats Puerto Rico as a state.
218
 For others, 
eligibility rules and reimbursement rates for the island differ based in 
part on explicit statutory rules.
219
 Medicaid is perhaps the most 
salient illustration of such programmatic differences.
220
 Though 
 
 216. Id. at 13. See also FED. RES. REPORT, supra note 50, at 13 (citing Jones Act as 
responsible for “import costs at least twice as high as in neighboring islands,” noting further 
that “[e]ven those that consider the negative effects of the Jones Act to be exaggerated . . . 
concede it is a clear net negative”). 
 217. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 218. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 410(h) (2012) (social security old age and survivor benefits and 
disability insurance). Puerto Rico and its citizens are eligible to participate in federal Medicaid 
and Medicare programs, but subject to different programmatic rules than those applicable to 
U.S. states. See GAO, INSULAR AREAS REPORT, supra note 178 at 9 (U.S. territories, including 
Puerto Rico, participate in three major federal health care financing programs: Medicare, 
Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)). 
 219. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-31, PUERTO RICO: INFORMATION ON 
HOW STATEHOOD WOULD POTENTIALLY AFFECT SELECTED FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND 
REVENUE SOURCES 7 (2014) [hereinafter GAO, INFORMATION ON STATEHOOD]. The Supreme 
Court permits the federal government to “treat Puerto Rico differently from the States so long 
as there is a rational basis for its actions.” Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) 
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to lower Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
assistance payments to Puerto Rico than to the states. See also Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 
U.S. 1, 4–5 (1978) (constitutional for U.S. citizen residing in the states to lose Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) benefits upon becoming a U.S. citizen residing in Puerto Rico, where 
SSI is not available). 
 220. To varying degrees, Puerto Rico is treated differently—sometimes better and worse—
under many other federal programs as well. For illustrative purposes, this Article uses only a 
sliver of the many programmatic differences with respect to health care funding. A more 
thorough treatment of even the health care differences is beyond the scope of this Article. For 
more detail, see generally ANNIE L. MACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44275, PUERTO RICO 
AND HEALTH CARE FINANCE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 21–22 (2016); GAO, INSULAR 
AREAS REPORT, supra note 178. For a general description of Puerto Rico-state differences for a 
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subject to various mandatory federal requirements, states are the 
primary administrators of Medicaid, and have significant discretion 
regarding its implementation.
221
 The formula for determining 
percentages of state Medicaid cost eligible for federal matching 
payments is designed to account for state variations in ability to pay 
by comparing each state’s per capita income to the national 
average,
222
 with the highest Federal Medical Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP) reimbursements going to states with the lowest per capita 
incomes. Based on recent calculations, for example, the highest 
current FMAP of 74.6% applies to Mississippi.
223
 Even though 
Puerto Rico’s per capita income is lower than the poorest state, its 
FMAP was statutorily set at 50%,
224
 until the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) increased the fixed rate to 55%.
225
 Another dramatic contrast 
is that—unlike to the unlimited federal Medicaid matching payments 
available to U.S. states –matching funds paid to insular areas, 
including Puerto Rico, are subject to an annual statutory cap; the 
result is that Puerto Rican citizens may not receive all Medicaid 
benefits to which they are entitled.
226
  
Some argue that Puerto Rico’s reduced Medicaid participation is 
warranted because Puerto Rican residents do not pay federal income 
taxes.
227
 While it may seem initially plausible, this argument does not 
 
wider array of federal programs, see GAO, INFORMATION ON STATEHOOD, supra note 219, at 
15–22 (fig. 3). 
 221. See GAO, INSULAR AREAS, supra note 178, at 9–11 (general description of Medicare 
and Medicaid).  
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012). 
 223. ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43847, MEDICAID’S FEDERAL 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE 1–2 (2016) (reporting matching rate ranges between 50 
and 83%). 
 224. This rate applies to all U.S. “insular areas,” the largest of which are Puerto Rico, 
Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands. GAO, INSULAR AREAS, supra note 178, at 1. The report further observes that 
the percentage match “for insular areas does not recognize their capacity to pay for Medicaid 
expenses; instead, the FMAP is set at the lowest rate . . . although all of the insular areas, except 
Guam, had a lower median household income that the poorest U.S. state.” Id. 
 225. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, § 2005(c), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 284 (2010) (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2012)). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 1308(a), (f), (g)(5) (2012). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, MEDICAID AND CHIP: INCREASED FUNDING IN U.S. TERRITORIES MERITS IMPROVED 
PROGRAM INTEGRITY EFFORTS 1–17, GAO-16-324 (2016) (regarding temporary funding 
increases under the ACA). See supra notes 177–81. 
 227. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 139, at 19.  
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account for several countervailing considerations. First, the federal 
income tax exemption available to residents applies only to income 
from Puerto Rican sources. In addition, Puerto Rican employers and 
their employees are required to pay federal employment taxes, some 
of which are designed to cover federal health care program costs.
228
 
Second, the Medicaid matching formula is designed precisely so that 
the poorest states—whose residents presumably contribute the least 
to federal income tax receipts—are entitled to the highest percentage 
federal funding rates.
229
 In other words, as a state, Puerto Rico would 
be entitled to substantially more than its current 55% Medicaid 
federal match despite its residents’ relatively small contributions to 
federal income tax revenues. I contend that Puerto Rico has a 
reasonable rebuttal argument to overcome initial presumptions 
against U.S. government assistance to the extent that the federal 
government’s unequal treatment of Puerto Rico under Medicaid 
contributed to the latter’s financial crisis.  
VI. STRUCTURING RELIEF AND ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF ASSISTANCE  
Central governments simply cannot credibly commit in advance to 
refuse any assistance to its distressed subnational governments. 
Should such government assistance ever be required, however, the 
federal government could reduce at least some moral hazard risks by 
clarifying in advance that: (1) rescue assistance will be provided only 
in rare and unusual circumstances, and the amount and type of such 
assistance will be tailored as narrowly as possible to address 
particular crisis circumstances; (2) conditions attached to any federal 
assistance will be sufficiently onerous that subnational governments 
should consider every plausible alternative before seeking federal 
help; and (3) any agreement to provide federal monetary assistance 
will include “claw-back” provisions that will require the subnational 
government to repay—to the extent possible, and over time, if 
necessary—an appropriate portion of any federal expenses incurred.  
 
 228. 26 U.S.C. § 933 (2012). See also, supra note 149. 
 229.  See supra notes 224–27, and accompanying text (Puerto Rico, though poorer than the 
poorest state, receives a 55% federal Medicaid matching rate subject to a cap, whereas the 
poorest states approach an 80% match without any cap). 
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One final observation is that difficult judgment calls are required 
in deciding whether, when, and how the federal government should 
intervene to assist struggling subnational governments. Such 
decisions would be challenging enough even for one person; they 
become almost immeasurable when they must be made through a 
partisan political process. Delays that are merely frustrating in 
everyday politics are far more troubling in moments of crisis when 
time is of the essence. When Congress is stymied, a sympathetic 
executive branch can sometimes engage in independent interventions. 
One such action, is to expedite federal payments for which the 
subnational government is already eligible.
230
 
Certain federal agencies, particularly the Treasury Department, 
also can often be in a position to quietly extend “covert” bailout-type 
relief to struggling entities by relaxing interpretation or application of 
tax rules. With the help of expert advice from a major U.S. law firm, 
whose partners include former high-ranking Treasury Department 
officials, Puerto Rican executive branch officials and legislators, for 
example, deftly worked with Treasury Department officials in 2011 
to take advantage of just such a “back-door” bailout. A short article 
by tax expert, Martin Sullivan, describes the scene: as the President’s 
Task Force on Puerto Rico over several years issued long reports and 
came up with wish lists for Congress that were unlikely to go 
anywhere, “Treasury officials were drafting a three-page document 
that would deliver billions of dollars of cash benefits to Puerto 
Rico.”231 The document was an IRS Notice, which announced that the 
IRS had not yet determined whether a Puerto Rican excise tax—
adopted in 2010 and extended in 2013 as part of the legislature’s 
explicit efforts to “overcome Puerto Rico’s economic crisis”232—was 
 
 230. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Press Release, U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx 
Joins Puerto Rico Governor García Padilla to Sign Historic Memorandum of Understanding 
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-transportation-secretary-
foxx-joins-puerto-rico-governor-garc%C3%ADa-padilla-sign (announcing federal assistance 
enabling Puerto Rican officials “to expeditiously access about $400 million in previously 
obligated federal funds for infrastructure projects . . .”). 
 231. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Treasury Bailout of Puerto Rico, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Jan. 27, 2014) (also describing the importance of Steptoe & Johnson’s role in 
providing advice and tax opinion letters). 
 232. 2013 Laws P.R. 2 (legislative preamble’s “statements of motives”). See also supra 
note 27 and accompanying text. 
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one for which U.S. taxpayers would be entitled to a foreign tax 
credit.
233
 More remarkably, the Notice further declared that until the 
legal and factual questions were resolved, the IRS would not 
challenge U.S. taxpayers claiming the credit, and that any later 
determination that the excise tax did not qualify for the credit would 
apply only prospectively.
234
 The end result was that Puerto Rico has 
been able—and continues—to raise substantial revenues from its 
excise tax collections from U.S. affiliates of Puerto Rican 
manufacturers while imposing little effective tax burden on those 
paying the tax. In effect, the substantial revenues collected in Puerto 
Rico are at the expense of substantial revenue foregone by the U.S. 
Treasury. When federal agencies engage in such regulatory 
forbearance or specific legal interpretation deliberately designed to 
assist private taxpayers or subnational governments in financial 
distress, they should be required to comply with an appropriate 
reporting mechanism designed to ensure greater transparency. 
CONCLUSION 
While federal government culpability or shared responsibility for 
the Puerto Rican financial crisis may not be immediately obvious, a 
closer look at the impact of past or ongoing federal government 
policies suggests that Puerto Rico’s economic woes may not be 
attributable solely to its own actions or inactions. Though quantifying 
the extent to which U.S. policies contributed to Puerto Rico’s 
economic problems over the past decade would be extraordinarily 
difficult, I believe there is ample evidence to suggest that the federal 
government bears at least some responsibility. Along similar lines, 
Joseph Stiglitz and Mark Medesh argue that Washington has 
essentially treated Puerto Rico as an absentee landlord, “want[ing] 
the benefits of an offshore tax haven without the responsibilities to 
rescue it in time of need.”235  
 
 233. I.R.S. Notice 2011-29, 2011-2 C.B. 663 (regarding the creditability of Puerto Rico’s 
excise tax against U.S. federal income pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 903). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Stiglitz & Medish, supra note 131. 
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And, even if the federal government did not contribute to Puerto 
Rico’s economic problems, providing support in times of critical 
need may simply be the right thing to do. As President Obama argued 
in one of his 2016 weekly addresses,  
Puerto Ricans are American citizens, just like folks in Maine 
or Oklahoma or New Mexico . . . . Right now, Puerto Rico 
doesn’t have the tools it needs to restructure its debt—tools 
available elsewhere in America. And only Congress can fix the 
problem, and put Puerto Rico on a path to recovery . . . . I want 
the people of Puerto Rico to know that my administration is 
committed to your success . . . . We don’t turn our backs on 
our fellow Americans.
236
  
Though Puerto Rico may eventually need direct financial assistance, 
providing appropriate help in times of need may be incremental and 
does not necessary require a commitment of substantial federal 
resources.
237
 Though more may be required, Congress for now has 
taken positive steps that at least should help Puerto Rico begin its 
economic recovery. PROMESA’s inclusion of the Puerto Rican 
government itself within the definition of “who may be a debtor,”238 
extends even greater bankruptcy-like protections than those available 
under Chapter 9, which do not extend to the states themselves. On the 
other hand, providing these protections subject to the ultimate control 
and authority of a presidentially-appointed oversight board arguably 
is inconsistent with democratic self-governance principles and does 
not treat Puerto Rico with the dignity it deserves. The policy and 
politics of deciding whether, when, and how the federal government 
should assist financially-distressed subnational governments are 
fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. Over the past two or three 
 
 236. Office of the Press Secretary, Weekly Address: Addressing Puerto Rico’s Economic 
Crisis, WHITE HOUSE (June 11, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/ 
06/11/weekly-address-addressing-puerto-ricos-economic-crisis. 
 237. In 2015, for example, the Treasury Department, organized teams of experts to advise 
Puerto Rican officials and otherwise took small actions to assist. See, e.g., Michael Corkery & 
Mary Williams Walsh, Treasury Considers Plan to Help Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2015, at B1; Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Officials to Testify on Debt Crisis Before 
Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2015, at B7. 
 238. 48 U.S.C. § 2162 (2016) (including as a debtor entity, a “territory that has requested 
the establishment of an Oversight Board or has had an Oversight Board established for it . . .”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments 267 
 
 
years, policymakers and legislators devoted extraordinary amounts of 
time and energy struggling with these questions and fashioning a 
response to the Puerto Rican crisis. This would be a good time to 
reflect on the most appropriate response in the event of similarly dire 
circumstances for one of the U.S. states. 
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